

GLOBALIZATION AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INTELLECTUAL

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The article analyses the relation between globalization and the responsibility of the intellectual. In the context of globalization the question of the responsibility of the intellectual is problematic. That is why we have to ponder on intellectual modesty and human measure of Socrates trying to analyse the phenomenon of globalization. The author discusses the dualism of the act and potency by Aristotle, that of mind and body by Descartes, the concept of the thing-in-itself by Kant and the radical principle by Hegel, and the utopias of Marxism and Capitalism at the end. The discussion is focused on the following question: does the logic of globalization has metaphysical roots, or it is just untenable claim to reduce all the cultures to the worldwide one without the possibility of the responsibility of the intellectual?

Key words: *homogeneity, metaphysical foundations of globalization, ontological debate, reflection, identity, universality.*

Introduction

The question of intellectual responsibility in confrontation with globalization is **THE** philosophical question from Socratic to modern philosophies. In brief, it is impossible to practice philosophy and not to raise this question. It is well known that Socrates stood his ground unto death with the demand that he and others have a duty to interrogate all claims to truth regardless of their origin. Intellectual honesty was for him a requirement to keep open

the discursive domain – called the *polis* – wherein the search for truth could be pursued. This means that the task of philosophy as such is identical with the maintenance of an open *polis* wherein all theories and propositions can be tested and contested. Hence, when we raise the question of the responsibility of the intellectual, we must recall the task for philosophy set by Socrates. Yet our situation is quite different from that of classical Athens. We are confronted by modern philosophy in its ontological and metaphysical guises that require

a serious consideration whether we can even think of the relationship between intellectual and responsibility. It is our task, then, to consider what sort of position will open up for an intellectual that would be worthy of philosophy.

Despite some variations, Socrates as well as classical Greek thought sought to understand all natural events from their **limits** (*pe-ras*). Every being is determined to be a specific kind of being by the limit which cannot be transgressed. Whether the limit is located in *topos noitos* (the place of ideas), or is the *morphe* (the inherent form of a thing) in each case they are the very essence of a given thing. In turn, the essence of a being is what comprises its very purpose, its Alpha and Omega, its intelligibility such that from the very inception of a given being, the form, the essence, is what determines the way the given being will unfold its *dynamis, kinesis*, its dynamics, the shape of its movement. The dynamics, therefore is intelligible at the outset because it manifests its own form as the very purpose of its unfolding. In this sense, every being has its own purpose which is its own essence. This means that the necessity of all beings is inherent in them. Contingency or accidental encounters do not alter the essence of beings. An animal, engaged in the unfolding of its essence as its purpose, such as grazing, may encounter a lightning, which too is unfolding its essence, would encounter an accident. The latter may be mechanical, but not essential to the beings of either event. Moreover, any notion of evolution is excluded a priori. A being does not evolve from previous beings nor does it evolve from itself by addition of elements from other events. In the former case, a parent does not produce something essentially higher than itself. It is the rule of *aitia*, an efficient cause, since the result can be equal, but never more

than its cause. In the second case, a being, as a result of its essential cause, cannot evolve, since at the very outset it contains its essence that will unfold to full actuality, but it will not change in itself. A monkey will produce monkeys and cannot be a cause of something more. In turn, beings have no histories, apart from differences in the unfolding of their essence. A human may become a carpenter, a baker, a scientist, but these factors do not change the essence of what a human being is; they are accidental encounters in specific settings. A human is born and will die a human.

This view did not remain unchallenged. Indeed, the philosophical problematic inherent in it was unfolded through centuries, leading to a dilemma that could not be resolved. The solution of the dilemma could only be accomplished by accepting one side as true and the other as irrelevant to objective thought and science. The brief discussion that follows is designed to articulate the ontological question concerning the very foundations of the world, leading to modern/postmodern thought. The latter is premised on very precise ontological and metaphysical prejudgments that open the conception of an individual subject whose “essence” is pure and unrestricted will. It is of note that such a will is not equivalent with the common notion of will as a “free choice” among available options. Rather, its choice is itself as a source of arbitrariness and its resultant power. Hence, we must first decipher the ontological problem that led to this state of affairs. It is of importance to note that this problem is not discussed in philosophical textbooks.

Ontological Debate

As mentioned, Greeks understood everything from the limit such that the latter comprised the very essence of an entity. An entity, as a

whole, has its specific characteristics which are not identical with, or derivable from the characteristics of the parts of which the entity is composed. To speak more precisely, the problem is concerned with the ontological priority of the whole over the parts or the parts over the whole. Does the whole possess characteristics of its own as a whole, or are its characteristics equal to the sum of the characteristics of the parts? Greek thought brought this issue to a basic philosophical debate. An entity, composed of parts, must be either an aggregate, like barley and wheat in a barrel, or the parts must blend into a unity. If the first position is true, then the entity, as a whole, cannot possess characteristics beyond those of the parts. If the second position holds, then the entity as a whole can possess characteristics which are more than the sum of the parts and their characteristics. Using a familiar modern example the problem can be formulated as follows: either water, and its characteristic of wetness is an entity, and as a whole is one basic unit of nature or the parts, hydrogen and oxygen, with their specific characteristics, are the basic units of nature. Since these units do not possess the characteristic of wetness, then their aggregation, to form water, cannot possess wetness. In this case, the whole is equal to the sum of its parts and their characteristics; this would mean that wetness, as a characteristic of the aggregate of the parts, cannot exist – it is some sort of ontological mistake of nature.

Another side of the argument is as follows: if the parts are unified into a whole, then they cannot retain their individual characteristics; if the latter were to remain, then the result would be an aggregate of individual parts and not a whole with its own characteristics. To form a whole, the parts must vanish as discrete components into the whole in order for the latter to possess its own characteristics. Here

we have a dilemma and Aristotle offered a specific solution to it. He argued that not only the parts but also their characteristics cannot disappear entirely into the whole. If they were to disappear entirely, then there would be no unification of parts into a whole, but a destruction of one set of entities – the parts – and a creation of an entirely new entity – the whole. This makes no sense. To make sense Aristotle proposes the following: (i) there must be a unification of parts into a whole; (ii) the unification cannot be a mere aggregate since in this case there would not be a whole with its own characteristics, but a sum of the parts and their characteristics; and (iii) the parts and their characteristics cannot be completely destroyed and a new entity generated, since in that case there would be creation of something out of nothing. It is absurd for something to come from nothing.

The basic problem that had to be solved is this: how is it possible for the parts to exist in a whole without losing their individual substantiality, and how is it possible for them to retain their individual substantiality without the whole remaining a mere aggregate? If the latter case were true, then the characteristics of the whole would be mere appearances. As one can readily see, this prefigures the modern distinction between secondary and primary characteristics of entities and, by implication, the modern subject-object dichotomy. Aristotle decided to solve this issue by introducing the notions of **potential** and **actual** existence. Since some things are potential while others actual, then the parts, combined in a whole, can in a sense be and yet not be. The whole can **actually** be other than the parts from which it has resulted, yet the parts can remain **potentially** what they were before they became combined into the whole. In turn, the attributes of the whole are **potentially** in the parts. Those attri-

butes become **actualized** when the parts are unified into the whole. With unification the attributes of the parts become **potential**. These arguments allow the conclusion that a whole, composed of parts, can have its specific attributes and be regarded as a basic ontological unit of nature. This also implies other types of realities. For example, the state, while composed of individual citizens, is more than the sum of interests of the individuals.

While this solution to the dilemma lasted through the medieval period, it was already challenged by Arab philosophers. The challenge points to a difficulty of the **potential** existence of parts in a whole. If the parts become **potential**, then the whole is composed of **potential** parts. But it makes no sense for an **actual** whole to be composed of **potential** parts. If the whole is **actual**, then the parts must be **actual**. Yet if the parts remain **actual**, with their individual attributes, then the whole is an aggregate sum of parts. In that case the attributes of the whole cannot belong to the parts – they have no ontological status and must be mere appearances. Given this irresolvable dilemma the thesis of the ontological priority of the unity of the whole was rejected and a theory of atomistic parts became the norm. It was granted that the basic ontological entity is a material part that cannot be destroyed or altered in the whole. All entities are sums of aggregates of parts extended in space and time. The experienced entities as unified wholes have no ontological status. The experienced characteristics of a unified entity must have another “place” and this place was designated to be a subject, containing all qualitative attributes that did not belong to the material, atomistic parts.

The consequences of this ontological decision were well developed by Galileo in natural sciences and by Hobbes in social and political

philosophy, and accepted by Descartes as the ground of his mind-body dualism. For him, the perceptible qualitative attributes of the whole are not only appearances but are dependent on the mental states of the experienter. If the atomic parts possess only material qualities, such as extension, size, position in space and time, then the entity as a whole is a numerical sum of parts. Resultantly, any experienced attributes of the whole must be apparent perceptions of the subject. In turn, what the subject experiences are not attributes of the unified entity, while the parts of which this entity is composed cannot be perceived. In short, what is accessible to experience is subjective and what is objective, reality of the ontological world of material parts is forever removed from direct experience.

The ontological shift in modern philosophy toward mechanistic atomism strips all essential structures from nature and replaces all beings with a sum of material parts functioning in accordance with mechanical laws. Therefore no beings of nature have any purpose. This ontological conception of all nature leaves one entity, the human as a thinking subject, who has purposes. But such purposes have nothing to do with the real, material world, including human bodies that function mechanically. Moreover, such thinking and its purposes, have no fixed rules or laws; it is basically voluntaristic. Hence human actions, directed by will, make their way that is distinct from the world of ontologically posited reality. Humans make history as a purposive process which might aim at some final end. The latter has been depicted by various utopian images, including some versions of Marxism and capitalism. If material events are needed in this purposive history, they are not ontologically material, but practically, i.e. what can we make of the indifferent, mechanical, and purpo-

seless stuff for our aims and presumed needs. We know the rest of the modern story as a progress of technology and human mastery of the material environment (including the material human as part of the environment). We also know the story of the metaphysics of the will pervading all modern philosophies in such guises as autonomy, arbitrariness and their manifestation as power.

Reflection

Having established a subject distinct from the material world, the next step was to assign essential functions for this subject. There is no way of escaping the conclusion that the primary activity of the subject is reflection upon itself, upon its own thinking, and upon its own powers, as guarantees of the validity of all claims and the possibility of their realization. All events must justify themselves in the court of the standards and rules established by a subject reflecting upon itself. Whatever appears to the subject, whether it is a physical thing, a foreign culture, a theory, or even a feeling, cannot be taken as it is in its own right, but must first justify itself before the self reflecting subject. Hegel ended the modern tradition by demonstrating its ultimate principle: **no longer thinking and being are the same, but reflecting thinking and being are the same.** It will not do to argue that various philosophical trends of the last century posited various explanations, even of the egological subject, in terms of social conditions, material or economic conditions, biological conditions and numerous other claims. Yet all of them posit their methods and theories derived from and adjudicated by reflection. Such adjudication is regarded to be critical and hence objective and universal. This universality is regarded as global and should be either imposed on or accepted by all rational beings.

The task then is to expound the results and implications following modern ontology and self reflecting subject as grounds of the universalistic – objective – logic of globalization, its modes of constructing self generation and self validation, and its metaphysical methodology and, in the final analysis, valuative and voluntaristic groundlessness. At the same time, we shall show how this universalistic trend fragments itself into multiple logics and discourses as arbitrary constructs and thus abolishes its own univocal position in favor of what current writers superficially call “power.” Our task in this sense, is to show other grounds for the claim of power, at least in the sense of being groundless and arbitrary. This is to say we can show that the very exercise of power in globalizing modernity has no other rules or criteria apart from its own self reflective generation. The basis of universalizing globalization is subtended and pervaded by conceptions that claim to explain power, whether social, economic, political, technocratic, while at the same time these very conceptions presuppose the self generation of power within which they are included. This means that these conceptions are in principle the ways of demonstrating the inevitability of arbitrariness and its resultant expression as globalizing power. In this sense, power is not something that is intended, but to the contrary all intentional awareness articulated in various modern disciplines and domains are constitutive of power that contains the logic of the transformation of the world. We hope that at this level we shall avoid any kind of psychological, valuative, genealogical, moralizing explanations, since even the latter are equally at the service of power.

All explanations without exception can be demonstrated to be participants in the very proliferation of power which such explanations may claim to challenge. Hence, the universalistic

ty of globalization and its subsequent critiques make it impossible in principle to escape this universalization in terms of its own logic. Every rationality that will challenge this universalization will accept its power logic, and hence will become inevitably part of that logic. As we shall show, even the breakdown of this universal logic into modern multiple logics, called scientific disciplines and discourses, are the means by which this universalization proliferates itself and survives. In this sense, the claims by postmodernists to multiple discursivity and therefore multiple discursive powers is a continuation of the maintenance of modern universalization. Thus, first it is the case that postmodernity is a continuation of modernity and has in fact globalized itself under the claim that it can save the other cultures from Western modernization. It is no wonder that various regions of the world that want to acquire identity in the pretended context of modern globalization are constantly appealing to being postmodern. Second, the various claims to cultural self identity, in contrast to modern universal individualism, is a variant of individualism at the cultural level. We know from philology that in modern West the challenge to individual universalism came from Herder who claimed that there is a cultural individualism with equal global rights. The notion of individuality at whatever level and its identity remains intact. Third, modern universalization and postmodern challenge to it follow the same logic and therefore impose individuality and the rights to it on the basis of a rationality which, as we noted, is already power laden.

In this sense the language that postmodern theses propose for multicultural logic, allowing each culture to have its own identity, at the same time talk about empowering the other. This is an assumption that pretends that ot-

hers are equally engaged in power and that all that they need is to be granted that power from us. This is obvious in American feminist movement that wants to empower the Arab women to have their rights to be individuals. What is at issue here is not whether these movements are right or wrong but whether they already assume and therefore impose the modern universal individualism whether singular or cultural in the name of power.

Given this context the next task is to show how this logic of universal globalization as founded on modern ontology and quantitative metaphysics have been intersected by Western theological symbolisms that lend priority to volitional arbitrariness and therefore anarchy over experienced perceptual differences. Particular modern Western theological-mystical position has become an aspect of the metaphysics of the will that dominates scientific reason in favor of arbitrary construction of rationality as an instrument. What Max Weber has demonstrated to be the origin of capitalist ethics is much broader to the extent that even scientific reason is at base volitional and therefore scientific discourses have no other criteria apart from the criteria that science itself constructs. Thus, it is no wonder that even philosophers of science talk about world making or paradigm construction, and even verification that itself has to be logically verified. This reflexive circle indicates in yet another manner that perceptual awareness of the world is suspicious and that arbitrary constructions is to be trusted.

Modern Universality

As has been noted from Descartes to Kant, the objective method, as a priori is formal and includes logic and mathematics. Therefore, everything that has to be understood scientifically must correspond to formal and quantitative ru-

les. In this sense, whatever we deal with, in science, must be quantifiable and therefore measurable. What we are pointing to is the presumption of the primacy of methodology and, by extension, theory over perceptual experience. Since formal quantitative method must exclude anything that is qualitative, then whatever would count as objective would have to correspond to the quantitative methods: measurable matter that disregards any qualitative differences. This is the point at which the modern subject is invented. He is the possessor of qualitative experiences, but in order to be scientific he must also use the quantitative formal methods to deal with the measurable reality.

The first problematic that arises for this modern subject consists of a contradiction. The measurable material reality is posited to be objective, homogenous, and yet the method as formal mathematical is not an aspect or part of this homogenous material reality. Since the latter is posited as the only existence and everything else is designated to be subjective, then the scientific formal and quantitative methods must be equally subjective. In this sense, we come to a clash between objective, material, homogenous reality, and a method of science that has no objective validity. The sole solution to this problem had to take on the following structure: the subject constructs theories and methods to be tested in material reality. But the subject has no criteria by which to judge which constructed method is the correct one. Being subjective, they have to be adjudicated on the basis of objectivity which is perceptually inaccessible. Since the imperceptible objectivity depends on the constructed methodology which is inevitably subjective, then the only way to deal with this objectivity is in terms of subjective constructs. Our point here is that there is not way to demonstrate at this level how the subjectively constructed methods

connect to the posited objectivity, i.e. the material reality. While the latter is posited as objective, it is also regarded as incapable of implying formal quantitative methodologies. In turn, these methodologies do not imply any empirical perception of this material reality directly, since by definition our direct perceptions are qualitative and therefore subjective.

In both cases, whether we start with the posited materiality as measurable, or whether we start with the subjective methodologies, we have not shown the connections between the two. The reason that the connection cannot be shown is that the qualitative experience that indicates the direct awareness of the difference among things, differences that are more than the sum of the material parts, is reduced to qualitative subjective experience, while the sum of measurable parts is posited as the objective reality, thus constituting the principal differences between subject and object. Our concern is this: given that objectivity is the sum of material parts and, by implication, everything else is subjective, then the formal and quantitative methods are equally subjective and therefore there is no connection between the subjective methods and the sum of the material objective parts. In this sense, there has to be an account by virtue of some median aspect that would allow us to understand how the posited objective material sum of parts can be connected to the subjective formal quantitative methodology. The modern issue here is one of mediation that goes from Descartes to Hegel and Marx, into the contemporary issues of the in-between domain the mediation. The point of principle that we want to articulate is how Western modern scientific logic proclaimed to be universal globalizing logic this issue of mediation. At one level it offered the notion that the connection between the subjective formal quantitative and the pure ma-

terial homogeneous some of parts is through application of method to “objective reality”.

The application is regarded as experimental testing of hypothesis in correlation to reality. The very testing means intervention. There is no notion of direct method that looks at the way things are but rather applying and testing means that somehow we must intervene in order to avoid our perceptual awareness and therefore to construct the so-called imperceptible material reality in terms of our methodological that is subjective structures. In that sense, we give priority to the methodological structures that require our intervention in order to construct the so-called material reality in accordance with our own subjective methods. It is no doubt that Kant drew the right conclusion: objectivity is synthesized by subjective a priori conditions. This means that we have modern science that connects different domains by a mediation which is our activity of applying the subjectively constituted logics and methods on the indifferent homogeneous materiality. Here at this level emerges a mediation that is neither the methodological, so-called formal quantitative rational, nor the so-called material homogeneous sum of parts, but a dimension that ranges between the two of them and has no criteria how to apply the formal to the material. This is the first intimation of a constructive process that emerges as the modern will. It becomes a selective process that has not posited anything apart from its own self generation.

This point of mediation has been called by modern philosophers “autonomy” suggesting that every formal and quantitative rule is constructed without any conditions, that is has no cause. In this sense, the material world subjected to those rules can be transformed without any question concerning the traditionally known categorical differences among **experienced limits of things**. In fact, the formal and qu-

antitative rules do not have within their own compositions any criteria for making such distinctions, thus they can be applied on everything indifferently. At the same time, the material world, the extended substance, must be regarded as homogeneous and, therefore, constructable in accordance with the invented rules. What is at issue at this level is the choice of formal and quantitative rules over qualitative categorical distinctions. Since both are by modern definitions subjective, then there is no inherent criterion why one would be more objective than the other. We must look for an account within the very composition of those invented rules. First, it can be argued that it is impossible to gain any advantage over the environment on the grounds of categorical, qualitative distinctions. Second, it is also the case that formal and quantitative rules comprise within their own structures techniques for transforming the material environment. This way the choice of formal quantitative rules already implies the choice of instrumentality and the possibility for application. The modern sciences whose theories and methods are framed within formal and quantitative structures is in principle technical. This is the reason why any scientific discipline that cannot be technically tested is not regarded to be scientific. This is another reason that all modern scientific and philosophical theories are premised on arbitrary power.

We have reached the point such that the constructed methods have no other criteria apart from being technical. While we have such methods they have to be connected to the material homogeneous world. This connection is provided by various theories, yet all theories assume body activity as a mediation through which scientific methods are applied. At this level is born a new definition of the human as a tool maker, as homo laborans, as practical man, including the primacy of pragmatism.

This is to say body becomes a constructed set of abilities in accordance with the requirements of technical discourses. This is to say such bodies must slowly become technical, productive, efficient, rule bounded, and perhaps fragmented into diverse functions. At the outset the mechanical and technical body takes precedence over body as simple physiological object. The latter will be judge on the basis of its abilities or disabilities to perform technical functions. What is of theoretical importance is that this required mediation precludes in principle to access the world as it is in itself. This is the reason for Kant's claim that "the thing in itself" is unknowable. Any effort to deal with the world of direct experience is deflected toward active intervention and manipulation of the environment in terms of our own invented formal and quantitative rules.

The globalizing process that promises to improve everyone's life and to bring liberation to all peoples from want and oppression is premised on claim to universality of this technical active intervention in the world. This intervention at the same time requires that all peoples anywhere and anytime must also engage in reducing their environments to required material resources for technical transformation and exploitation. The term "liberation" was at times replaced by humanization in a sense that we as natural beings in a natural environment are subjected to forces that are not under our control. That is they are alien and inhuman. Therefore, once the environment and our own lives are subjected to the scientific methods and their way of transforming the environment and us, then we shall reach a human stage which liberates us from natural necessities. At this level, this universal claim provides a rationale for teleology and progress. The teleology proposes that there is a stage in which man will be a total master of the environment and himself

and this then provides a standard on the basis on which others, those who have not yet joined "human history" will have to judge their positions and lives as inferior. This is the logic that is offered by numerous organizations caught in theories of development.

The universal claim to this construct that has equally become a logic of globalization is the ground of various theories of power. At the outset, the very instrumentalization of method and theory applied through the mediation of body activity on the material homogenized world has an implicit premise: the increasing application of our methods and the transformation of the environment in terms of our own controls lead to an increasing ability to master and control domains of the environment and, therefore, to acquire greater power over the environment and ourselves. It is to be recalled that the methods and theories are not given objectively but are constructed as instruments to reshape the environment, and as instruments they are at the service of autonomous will. The latter sets its own criteria for increased mastery and therefore increased power to master of all discourses as power laden. **We have reached a position of the metaphysics of the will that, while generating itself, it generates the very rules by which the world is to be constructed. This self generation of itself and rules is the ground of modern anarchy and "human divine complex." After all, only divinities create themselves and the laws by which the world is constructed. Abolishing all the experienced limits, this will is an arbitrary source and power that abolishes all limits by its reductive and homogenizing metaphysics.**

Modern Western Universal Identity

Postmodern texts inclusive of deconstructive logics have proclaimed the death of identity

and specifically the identity of the subject. The problem is that they were not seriously concerned what is the subject that was challenged. Based on our previous notions of scientific method and reconstruction of the world in favor of humanity there is the background subject that has no pre-given definitions. The modern subject that has been universalized in various pronouncements that include United Nations' universal human rights, both individual and cultural, and postmodern claims that demand respect for different cultural styles to self-determination are premised on a modern understanding of subject as self-generating. At the dawn of Western modernity, Pico de la Mirandola has announced that the human has no nature, has no essence, has no rules by which to live, and therefore whatever nature the human will possess whatever rules will be followed whether scientific or political will have to be invented as if "out of nothing".

While previous arguments leading to modern ontology and metaphysics constructed a modern subject as a place of qualitative, although non-existing experiences and reflection upon itself, a further task is to explicate this subject at its very base. We made a suggestion that the modern subject intends to be self-created without any other conditions, including theological, scientific, and ontological to the extent that the very distinctions between those terms are equally invented without precedence. This is the intentionality that comprises the background for the articulation of what a human is as self-created, a **being with divine complex**. Ontologically speaking, there is no pre-given subject that can be used as a criterion to determine what this subject is. Even Descartes could not avoid this intentionality when he argued that despite its power, an evil genius cannot do anything against the fact that I constitute my own thoughts prior to truth and

falsity. In short, the subject here escapes even and infinite power. The subject is posited as totally self-constituting without any conditions or, to speak with Kant, an unconditional subject. It seems that at this level, the constitution of modern subject has no essential criteria that would be used to judge what the subject is as identity. This type of self-creative subject is totally autonomous, and its autonomy creates unconditional methods and theories that then through an autonomous will and body practice it can create its own environment. As noted, a major aspect of this creation is scientific methodology and technology. This unconditional subject is the very principle and purpose of modern Western science and philosophy. As Marx inadvertently noted the future man, having gone through the labor of transforming the environment and the human in accordance with rules of total mastery of nature, will be in a position to be totally self-created. Hence, the beginning of modernity is equally its telos where the logic of self-creation of the subject subtends the scientific, social, and political theories that play a role in establishing the conditions for this "subject."

At this level, we reach once again the principle on the basis of which the Others of the other parts of the world are to judge themselves: have they established the conditions that would allow them to be free from all the blind material natural forces and be in a position not only to master such forces, but to create those forces in order to allow the human to use them for self-creation. This is the subject as *sui generis* and the final reason for human history. In this sense, the efforts to deconstruct this kind of self-generating subject may fail because the subject at the outset does not have any identity. It promises the unconditional conditions for everyone to acquire self-identity, to become any identity. This way, the

postmodern logic is premised on the modern autonomous subject. The postmodern logic in principle claims that all cultural identities, including our own, have no causal, natural, supernatural necessitation, but are pure rhetorical constructs. This means that they still accept the self creation of the modern subject that invents its own logic for mastery of its own world and for self definition. The egological self definition is only one among many options. The postmodern globalization assumes this universal self generating subject that invents different cultures without any natural, material, psychological conditions. After all, postmodernity claims that everything is a construct. The very notion of a construct is premised on modern autonomous unconditional subject. This subject is universalized as the possibility of identity for anyone. That is anyone can create of himself or herself whatever they want.

Of course there is no one specific identity that is offered, but only the process by which everyone can either invent their identities or accept the identities offered by their cultures. This is to say it is impossible for any culture to claim that it has an identity without having accepted the logic of choice between the right of every individual to make his/her own identity, or the right of a particular group to respect their own identity. The globalizing universality of the modern subject is being proliferated by postmodernity in such a way that the others in their own self reflection upon who they are, are already placed in a context wherein they must play out their lives, between what they can be as universal individuals or what they can maintain as members of their culture. The autonomous self creating subject that is being globalized as universal has become a background on which the Others as culturally different would be inscribed with their own rights to maintain their culture as singular, individual,

unique, with a right to self preservation. This self preservation is a phenomenon that has no basis in any ontological, metaphysical, or theological claims since all these are equally unconditional cultural inventions. Therefore, they will have to be adjudicated in power confrontations each calling for the maintenance of its own position as means to preserve a cultural identity. **Nonetheless in principle it is impossible to say what the limits are to this self creation syndrome and hence no definition can be offered concerning the criteria by which we can treat one another. Resultantly, modern West, on the basis of its own ontology and metaphysics of the will, cannot constitute intellectual responsibility for itself and for the others. Some of the intellectuals, engaged in helping the others in development, follow the same globalizing logic of willful destruction – and do so on a hidden premise of evolution: the unenlightened others are on a lesser level of evolution and hence have to be brought up to modern instrumental rationality by discarding their outdated myths and modes of life.** Of course such discarding will not offer an avenue to some metaphysical truth about “reality in itself,” but only to the metaphysics of the will to be part of the arbitrary treatment of the environment and others and hence part of the power confrontations that dominate the current social, political, economic, and technocratic events – to become part of the syndrome of modern-postmodern West.

Multiplicity of Cultures and Discourses

Nonetheless, the globalizing logic, encountering other cultures, must face up to the possible fact that it is logically self contradictory. To lead to this self contradiction it is necessary to point to some problems in cultural unders-

tanding. Cultural anthropology has to contend with the following issues, specifically ones that require methodological access to the cultural phenomena and their multiplicity, and the presumed objectivity which is required as a guarantee to truth claims by theorists of culture. First, there is a claim that any member of a given group belongs to and understands itself within and in terms of its own culture. But this would mean that there cannot be any privileged persons who could “escape” their own cultural understanding in order to see it from “outside.” How does one “alienate” oneself from one’s culture, if the very culture regards itself as alienating? One is already stuck in a cultural position and hence cannot claim to have any culturally impartial attitude. Indeed, the very comprehension of impartiality is an aspect of a given culture. Second, the major solution to this issue may be offered by some of the major comparative theories. The latter want to argue that it is possible to understand one’s own culture from the vantage point of comparison with another culture. This suggests that one knows another culture by being immersed in it and hence having obtained a similar comprehension as the “natives.” This is to say, from this position one may claim that it is possible to see one’s own culture in terms of the limits that the other culture offers. The other culture is, after all, radically different, and we understand ourselves and the other in terms of such difference.

Given this complex claim, it is impossible to offer a methodology that would allow us to understand our own culture, since, seen from the culture of the other, our culture is already incorporated and interpreted in terms of the other culture. This means that either one picks up another culture as a limit of one’s own and interprets it in terms of one’s own cultural grammar and hence has not escaped the pro-

blem of seeing one’s culture at its limit, or one adopts the other culture and translates one’s own culture in terms of the grammar of the other culture. In neither case has one gained any methodological access to one’s own, and indeed to the other’s culture. To speak pedagogically, if I am going to lecture on another culture, and claim that it is radically different from my own, I shall do so in terms of my language that is comprehensible to the audience to which I am communicating. Both, the audience and I understand the other culture by giving it our own cultural context and grammar of interpretation. The same can be said in reverse, when talking in terms of the other culture about our culture; in this case what we would get is the other’s incorporation of our culture into their context and grammar, and hence without offering anything more than their cultural frame – but comprehensible only to those who are part of, or have been immersed in the culture of the other. Third, we face, what could be called the hysteria of objectivity. By “hysteria” I mean the shock that objectively speaking other cultures have to be treated as equivalent to our own. We attempt “historically” to deny this equivalence by imposing our own globalization without noticing the contradictory position in which we find ourselves. This is to say, the scientific modern Western pronouncement that everything has to be treated with objective impartiality, requires the positing of our own culture as one among others, having no right to claim to be privileged in its various pronouncements. But this is the hysterical point: the claim to scientific objectivity is one aspect of Western modern culture and belongs to the interpretive context of this culture. Hence, the very claim to Western scientific superiority as having methods to access all phenomena objectively, is a culture bound position that cannot be universal wit-

hout a contradiction. After all, “objectively speaking” other cultures, as equal, have very different understandings that do not include such tandems as “objectivity” or for that matter “subjectivity.”

Culturally objectively speaking, we cannot deny them their different reading of cultural, and indeed all other, phenomena. To say that the others are wrong would be tantamount to saying that while it is modern Western culture, it is also a criterion of a “universal culture.” But in this sense, one abolishes the treatment of other cultures as given objectively and equivalently. We then would posit our culture as universal and require that all others interpret themselves in terms of our own requirements. Yet, by the claim of treating all other cultures objectively and without prejudice, we have just offered a position that requires (1) the treatment of other cultures not as they are but as they are interpreted in terms of one culture’s requirements, or (2) of surrendering our cultural prejudice of objectivity, and allowing other cultures their modes of awareness that do not regard themselves as either objective or subjective. Given this setting, we revert back to the problematic mentioned above: how can one claim to know the other “objectively” when one has imposed one’s own cultural component of “objectivity” on others and hence not only did not understand the other culture, but failed to escape one’s own culture. In this sense, the very claim to be able to treat one’s own culture objectively, is to accept this very culture without any “objectivity,” since one already lives and accepts the terms of her own culture.

Given this problematic, we can note the minor variations that face the same nonsensical dilemmas. Various Western critical cultural movements posit implicit valuative postures that seem to show the limits of our own and those of other peoples cultures. The limits rest

with the claim of cultural relativism. **By the very logic of being culture bound, any claim to cultural relativism becomes an aspect of one culture and thus ceases to be a universal necessity. Moreover, the limit is also reached with the tacit assumption that despite their radical differences, all cultures are human. If this assumption were not present, then we would end up in a position wherein each culture defines its own members in a unique way such that what is human in one need not be human in another – indeed in some cultures there may not be “humans” at all, since they may not have such terms as “human.” But if the claim is made that despite variations all cultures are human, then we have to admit an awareness of ourselves and others as human. This awareness has not been articulated in modern/postmodern philosophies.**

Due to this modern context, we have reached a point at which every culture is regarded to be self generating without any ontological, metaphysical, or theological grounds. If there are such grounds, then they are equally inventions of a specific culture. This is to say the modern globalizing position led to the conclusion that all discourses are autonomously constituted and, therefore, are equivalent to one another. After all, there are no criteria external to such discourses which will allow the adjudication among them concerning any truth claims. If there is anything common among them, it is their difference. Given this autonomous level, the theories that at times may still claim that some discourses somehow represent something are no longer maintainable. But this also implies that there is no misrepresentation. A particular discourse that frames a cultural world view is in no position to either represent the Others or to misrepresent them. The only thing that can be suggested is that each discourse inclusive of cultural discourses, will

interpret Others within the parameters of a giving discourse. This is of course premised on the basis of the abolition of an essential presence of a subject or a structure of the world. But this essentialism has been already destroyed by the assumption that even the modern subject has no essence, but must make himself in terms of the very discourses that he will invent. In this sense, the multicultural proposition is not premised on a pre-given essentialism, but in fact is constituted on the globalizing modern self destruction of an essential subject. The only criterion that this globalizing self invention, both of the individual subjectivity and multicultural identities, is its practical efficiency. It is not a question of the nature of the world, or the essence of the subject, but a view toward what works. If there is a claim that a particular people have specific needs, then technical discourses and practices will be devised and offered.

For multiculturalism the question that must be addressed is whether a given culture with its own constituted discourses has the same practical global needs that the globalizing autonomy is offering. This is to say does a particular cultural discourse allows the definition of the environment to be reduced to homogeneous resources for arbitrary reconstruction? The first limit of modern non-essential conception of total and unconditional possibility of inventing any discourse for the sake of applying it for "human needs" may be given in the discourses of Other cultures. In order to set a limit for globalizing modernity, we must demonstrate that within the logic of this globalization there is also a reflective recognition that it as invented culture must respect the equivalences of other invented cultures without any other criteria apart from those that each cultural discourse possesses within itself. This means that if another culture has a diffe-

rent ontology and even metaphysics then there are no reasons why that ontology or metaphysics should be disregarded or rejected, because it does not operate with the supposed efficiency, productivity, and exploitation of the homogenized environment and functional human. **The limit would be set with the lack of primacy of instrumental rationality.** If the meaning of life of a particular people within their own cultural parameters does not require the fulfillment of indefinite multitude of pleasures, variety of middle class consumptions, then that culture must be in principle, and on the basis of globalizing modern logic permitted to pursue its own mode of having a lifeworld.

To sharpen our argument and the parameters within which the discussion of globalization and multiculturalism could play out its destiny, we suggest that the very abolition of a pre-given subject in favor of self invention in modern sense leads to the notion not only that the Others are equally self inventive, but also the limitation of the concept of the self invention to the modern logic of Western autonomy and instrumentality. This is to say that if every discourse is deemed to be invented and only valid within its own framework, then the very concept of discursive self generation belongs within the framework of modernist and Western postmodernist discourse. But this means that even if the Other cultures are regarded as self generated, their self generation may have very different self conceptions, ontologies, methods, and practices that did not respect the logic of modernizing and globalizing ontologies and methods. Practically speaking this means that whatever purposes there are and however the environment is interpreted need no follow the logic of causal efficiency of reconstructing the world into our own needs and power. If a culture regards that playing music, listening to the stories of the ancients is mea-

ningful and the metaphysical entities are relevant for life as protectors of the environment then there cannot be an introduction of a criterion that would claim that such conceptions are not realistic, mystical, non productive, since the latter concepts belong to another framework. In brief, the confrontation between the two is not between some truth and some falsity, but between two discursive frameworks, wherein each will interpret the Other in its own unique way.

Yet it is also the case that a globalizing logic with its technical efficiency and promise of better life is an aspect of the Others. They see themselves in relationship to this efficient liberation from natural necessities, which becomes part of their own self understanding as different from and yet related to this globalizing logic. This creates an internal tension within various cultures that constitute dual self recognition wherein one still maintains his own cultural discourses yet also judges those discourses in light of the global Other. This is the source of alienation and destruction of cultural self identity. We still want to maintain cultural identity, but we also like to be like the Other, to judge our selves from the vantage point of the Other. This is an invention of a dual consciousness that frames the power struggles within various cultures. The modernizers who at the same time claim to be part of the same culture want to transform that culture into civilized, practically efficient, objective, and beneficial. While it liberates the individuals from her own culture yet there is a wish to claim against the globalizing process the uniqueness of her own culture. In one sense, there is a demand to use the environment in a “desacralized” manner, purely for the purpose of the benefit of social members, whether the benefit is health, employment, increased wages as signs of the good life.

In another sense, there is a wish to claim that we in our culture have our spiritual values that do not allow reducing the environment, including the human, to mere resources. Within this tension, the adjudication cannot be had on the basis of some criteria that would be able to adjudicate which is more true. The only solution to this tension is power. Hence, we witness the many confrontations between the groups within given cultures that promote modernizations and at the same time intellectuals who resist modernizations. This means that a given culture is split into those who propagate the need to become globalized and modern and at the same time those who, recognizing the necessity of modernization, propose a battle against it as imposition of alien culture. In principle, they claim that we may use the efficiency of modern technology to resist the very logic that this technology imposes on us. In this sense, the very globalizing logic constitutes a power confrontation, all the way from holy wars to so-called passive resistances. Yet, in every case it seems that the reason for this power confrontation rest in the failure to understand the already posited limit within which the globalizing process must function.

This limit is the very requirement that the Other and its self generated cultural framework is equivalent to the globalizing logic. Therefore, the latter sees to be universal and yet it must accept whether it wants to or not its own limitations. When we say whether wants it or not, we do not mean a choice between two options, but a power confrontation that is inevitable since there are no external criteria in this confrontation that would allow free decision. What we have is a temporal horizon of possibilities in such a way that one possibility is regarded to be recuperation of the past, while the other is offered as the future. Politically speaking, the rhetoric states that the one from

the past is conservative and traditional, while the other is liberal, individualistic open, and even humanistic. Whether this designation is true or false is not our concern. Yet it is generally claimed that those, in their dual consciousness, will play out their roles as both maintaining their tradition and at the same time proposing future transformations.

At this point, a specific conception of the world of time is divided into closed past and open future. This conception subtends or underlies Western modern globalization: anything in the past can no longer be changed and therefore to return to it would mean to return to something changeless and thus conservative, while the escape from it would require an open and undetermined future projected by the will. This is the confrontation between any given tradition as a determined history and its rejection in favor of constructed and undetermined future. It is of note that the modern Western globalization is characterized by the shift of temporal awareness from the rejection of the “irrelevant” past to possibilizing future. The Western globalization is premised on an implicit construction of time awareness that leads to the rejection of anything that is permanent or with set limits.

Our challenge at the cultural level is whether this time awareness is universal. The cultural logics must be investigated within the parameters of peoples’ understanding of their world not only in terms of the lifeworlds and discursive practices, but also the lifeworlds that are subtended by the cultural preconceptions of what constitutes the universe as time. Within this context, we hope to articulate the limits wherein even the power confrontations of the dual consciousness find their own limitations. Each culture has its own world conceptions as conditions for their own self understanding. If there is going to be any adjudi-

cation among cultures underneath the power confrontations such adjudications will have to articulate the world conceptions of various peoples. In this sense, the challenge to the globalizing logic will not come from the acceptance by the Other of the efficient technical means that make their own culture inadequate, but by the recognition that their own culture has a very different world understanding. We know from other cultures, whether Mayan, Hindu, or Taoist that the world understanding, even at the ontological or metaphysical levels, is different from the Western scientific and linear conceptions. So the task of cultural studies is to find the cosmic awareness that underlie their cultural parameters.

The Limit

In the life world of modern globalization there is a constant **deflection** away from the human and its replacement by systems of values that make the human into a secondary and dependent phenomenon. What Heidegger was afraid of in his *Letter on Humanism* – the centering of all modern thought on the human, turns out to be a mistaken understanding. The human is not the center if we note the battle for values in current public “debate.” In the U.S. the much publicized issue of “family values,” leading to the emotional question as to who can marry whom, reveals a deflection from the human toward family, divine law, natural essentialism, social traditions, and genetic or cultural determinants. While these are values in the public debate, they release the human from any rights and above all from responsibilities. It is nature that makes us who we are, it is culture or social tradition that has shaped our way of being, and it is divine law that demands our compliance. In all cases of such public debates, which may be deemed to be de-

mocratically guaranteed free speech, there is a constant rejection of such freedom by enlightenments tendency to “explain” and thus abolish the very public domain as that of autonomy. Even the latter is interpreted as one aspect of a contingent fact based on a contingent history of one tradition. Given other tradition such a fact could not arise. Hence, its universality is particular and cannot be used to understand life worlds of other traditions.

One result of the introduction of **contingency** is the abolition of truth and its replacement by rhetoric. If all depends on historical traditions and their modes of interpretation, then different traditions have different interpretations, each claiming the right to its truths as equivalent with those of others. In addition, even a historical tradition is composed of a variety of histories with equal claim to their truths and hence to an increasing contingency of what truth is, ending in the notion that “truth is whatever a given history, a given culture, a given discipline, literary work, religious text may say.” They all have value and need not address any content; they all are equivalent rhetorical figures. And no one lies, since what an individual states depends on the framework of a particular culture and its requirements. In a business or corporate setting, where profit is of essence, one can tell anything as long as the statements made are valuable to enhance the incrementation of profit. One would be a fool to do otherwise. The same can be said of any discipline, specifically of any technical discipline. The latter are constructs and function on the basis of production of what is valuable for human consumption: whether it is designed food products or medications, the claim has to be made that each product is “contingent” and cannot be a cure for all ills. In this sense, the claims are statistical: the value of this product is presented with various disclaimers: in seven-

ty percent of cases it will cure the liver, but it might cause high blood pressure, impotency, dizziness, and nightmares. And all these disclaimers are equally contingent. Thus one cannot say that the producers lie; they simply say that given the complexity of a specific organism, we cannot account for all possible implications. If something goes wrong with a given biotechnology, the answer is “we did not have sufficient evidence to warn against all results.” In principle, nonetheless, the human is a complex organism and nothing more, and the entire constructed environment is to maintain that organism. This is one major aspect of the crisis of democracy in the life world established by enlightenment.

What is crucial is the recognition of “value” as an invariant in this type of life world. What is at issue here is also the separation of value from fact. Facts, for modern ontology, have no value. Hence, values are constructed and imposed by us on facts. Such imposition takes on various forms, one of which is the globalization of “Western values” and, above all, of technocratic rulership by qualified experts. This globalization assumes that values can be exported; hence “democratic values” can be packaged and sent abroad on aircraft carriers, rockets, tanks and troops. It is deemed that anyone in the world would be more than pleased to welcome and “adopt” such values.

But values and valuations have to be evaluated not by their own self proliferating construction, but by a discovery of a constitutive awareness that is correlated to a tacitly lived *eidos* offering the possibility of performing a suspension of commitment to a given life world. The transcendental requirement is to disclose this *eidos* that would be an all pervasive presence demanding a transformation of a given, and specifically of the life world of political enlightenment. Instead of constructed

values, this *eidos* can be called WORTH. As we shall see, the latter cannot be constructed and it appears in the background of all values and valuations. It also provides a background on which every life world can be regarded in its essential morphology and questioned concerning its legitimacy. In this sense, the first task is to explicate the life world of enlightenment, inclusive of its two essential aspects, democracy and domination by experts, and to note their internal and inevitable connection and, in the final analyses inadequacy. The latter lies in its constructive character and hence comprises a fundamental crisis of democracy. This is not to say that it is therefore invalidated. Rather, its limits are exhibited from a transcendental lived awareness that demands “more” and does so on the basis of discovery what this more is. The constitution of this more – what will be called **worth** – is not a construction but a disclosure of an intentionality whose meant objectivity, its *eidos* as **worth**, is present as absolute. We should not despair while using the term absolute; after all, in all awareness there are such terms comprising a pregiven *arche* whose denial is its unavoidable inclusion. This is to say, to attempt to negate an *arche* is to include it in the very negation and hence to comprise its absolute affirmation. We shall call this the **principle of self inclusion** and venture a claim that only transcendental phenomenology is in a position to function within this principle. Now we are in a position to expound on the crisis of democracy by showing what sort of life world it has established and the limits it has imposed upon itself.

It is necessary to turn to the essence of the life world of enlightenment in which we find ourselves. **IT IS A PROCESS OF VALUATION**. Everything in the universe assumes a value to the extent that it serves our interests. Contrary to claims that the world has no va-

lue, the current world, constructed by enlightenment, is full of values: values for sale, values produced and to be produced, values of stocks and bonds, values of education, family values, religious values, ideologically constructed values, the changing and the new values, value of life and even calculated death. Indeed, the basic mode of awareness is valuative selectivity. It should be clear also that awareness and perception are no longer given in some pure empirical sense, but are selected on the grounds of valuation. In this sense, what is given as a plethora of empirical environment is, for the most part, ignored. What is perceived depends on its specific value.

Indeed, there are social mechanisms that not only consist of values, but evaluation of values that select specific ones deemed currently relevant in terms of future value projects. It has been argued that all these values are human and hence the primacy is placed on modern subject as the source of values. This claim would hold if the human were a distinct and decisive category, wherein all other categories and processes were subservient to humans. But this is no longer the case, since other values, such as technologies of various sorts, from electronic media to genetic biochemistry compel the understanding of the human to be **equivalent** to the rest of the values. This means that genetic biochemistry will not treat the human as a special category, but will have to reduce all human functions to biochemistry. Thus the environment, that is constructed on the basis of the process of valuation and is deemed to be objective, requires that the human be treated equally objectively in terms of what such an environment demands, i.e. interpretation of the human as material, chemical, biological, physical entity in order that such constructed technical values could be applied and thus useful and valuable. The public domain, once

deemed the space of autonomous beings, has become a battle ground of values: what is more valuable, jobs or forests, production or clean air, god or freedom of choice?

The awareness of crises constitutes a unique reflective moment that, at the same time, allows a suspension of one's participation in a given life world. We are cognizant, by now, that while living in a particular life world we are not aware of its basic composition. We live in it as if it were self evident and all inclusive. There is nothing lacking in it to the extent that it would not offer relief and answers to all of our questions. If we claim to live in a democratic life world, we take for granted that our elected officials tend to lie, that we can vote them out of office, that the injustices can be corrected by legal means, and that those who work harder deserve more. We also know that we would not tolerate dictators or anyone who would deny our right to make our own choices and mistakes. There must be a unique situation which allows us to extricate from our life world and to raise the question of its legitimacy. That such a question can arise means that we rise to lived awareness which no longer belongs to a life world in which we live. This must be made clear: our awareness is always world oriented and our orientations, or intentional directions find, in their life world if not total, at least partial perceptual affirmation. This is an epistemic aspect which takes for granted the division of our life world into categories and the way they are concretized or given perceptual fulfillment. But the fulfillment of our taken for granted intentions and the categories to which they correlate, including the numerous value gradations – the epistemic understanding – leave out the legitimating question given in live awareness that something is not fulfilled, something that no value can account for: **INTRINSIC SELF WORTH**. To reach the

latter, the lived awareness must suspend the life world and explicate the access to the transcendental lived awareness that correlates to intrinsic self worth and demands legitimation of the life world in which one has so far lived in full belief and affirmation. The lived awareness and its intention toward self worth asks whether the life world offers any fulfillment and confirmation of this intention. At this level of awareness the categorical and epistemic understanding fails, and an existential question of action becomes preeminent. Can I act, as I have always acted, and fulfill the intention of my intrinsic self worth? The latter embodies such requirements as honor, honesty, dignity, self and other respect, and justice. If honor, honesty, dignity and respect cannot be fulfilled in my activities, then the legitimacy of this life world is placed in absolute question, revealing at the same time the awareness of **ABSOLUTE SELF WORTH**. It is at this juncture that the transcendental lived awareness recognizes that the world of values, constructed by Enlightenment, requires evaluation as to its adequacy for human worth. Such a question is one of principle that required an essential delimitation of the construct of democracy and whether the latter could be adjusted, discarded or become open to the absolute requirement of transcendental awareness of self worth. We are in a position, now to attempt our venture into lived awareness that is lead by the intention correlated to self worth and thus a crisis in enlightenment.

There is no need to go into a variety of utilitarianisms since in principle they follow the logic of valuation on the basis of psycho-physiological needs. Utilitarianisms have no philosophical importance, since they presume that we all seek pleasure and value things and others insofar as they will comprise some means to fulfill our pleasures. Indeed, such a psycho-

logized ethos is precisely what leads to crisis of democracy insofar the technical promises by elected officials to fulfill our pleasures lead the public away from public participation and hence maintenance of the public domain. Besides, striving to fulfill pleasures suggests our complete subjection to irrational drives and a loss of any sense of autonomy. Hence, our task is to seek a more profound conception of enlightenment's failure to provide the ground of its ethos. We already know that the highest point of Enlightenment, Kant's critical works, have left us with a quandary regarding the final arbiter in human action. It was not the universal moral imperative demanding that we act out of respect for this imperative originating as it were out of total autonomy, but the empty condition called *good will*. It is empty because it is purely formal and has no existential implications. There is no content by which to decide what sort of action would be recognizable as one that follows good will. It is to be noted that the universal moral imperative, having total autonomy as its source, does not require a commitment to others, apart from not treating them as means but always as ends. Being universal, this imperative does not singularize and does not require respect for the other as having intrinsic worth; it simply requires obedience to the imperative or, as Kant would have it, obedience out of respect for the law.

But respect for the law implies something more basic, some lived awareness that connects to the worth of a singular person beyond his/her value and demands a treatment of oneself and the others in an honorable, noble, truthful, elevating manner **for its own sake**. This also suggests a crisis of democracy insofar as it has been reduced for the sake of other purposes such, as Regan once boasted, making money and getting rich. It seems that the loss of democracy for its own sake is premised on the

reduction of the human to a purposive value and thus the exclusion of worth for its own sake. The transcendental rule that emerges at this level of awareness is **THE DEGRADATION OF THE HUMAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO A PURPOSIVE VALUE AND, BY IMPLICATION, VALUELESSNESS**. Yet both democratic ethos and the final arbiter of all values cannot be value; they are for their own sake and comprise a lived awareness that already recognizes intrinsic self worth as that which is coextensive with democratic ethos. Self worth and democratic ethos for their own sake comprise the lived awareness of the missing aspect of the way that enlightenments intentionality has unfolded. Here a person is exposed to treat the lived world, and her immersion in it, as inadequate and thus place such a world and herself out of play, in brackets.

It is, then, the task to unfold the lived awareness that is compelled to bracket, to place out of action, the life world of enlightenment and to note the presence of this lived awareness across diverse phenomena. All the intentional orientations toward a life world in which she has been immersed appear to be groundless constructs; the life world of public domain, which is no longer maintained, requires and recognizes a presence of intrinsic self worth even in its denial. In the most degraded figures that our age has produced there appears an intimation of self worth. Let us look at the logic of intrinsic worth. In the life world where everything is a trash bin of values, there emerge personal actions and expressions that demand honor, dignity, respect, truthfulness, not only of themselves but of others. Indeed, their actions are equally an indication of intrinsic self worth of others. It would be impossible to be a racist and degrade others without recognizing the other as a possessor of intrinsic self worth. We cannot degrade a creature who, in

its life world, does not recognize a need to justify its deeds, to make a choice between two life worlds; in short, to call a dog – dog, is neither a degradation nor a negation of intrinsic worth. Only another person can be degraded on the basis of recognition of her intrinsic worth. This is to say, degradation, reduction, insult, are possible only when we recognize hers and our own intrinsic worth, honor, and dignity. This recognition is the ground of numerous events of our sophisticated age, among which is racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism and even homophobia and religions.

Degrading of others in an effort to elevate oneself, is an indication of the worth of others, an indication of our anxiety in face of the other's intrinsic self worth, her unavoidable height. Unable to withstand the other's self worth, we condemn her to death and thus prove that we are unwilling to admit our own self degradation, our own crisis, and cannot withstand the dignity of the intrinsic self worth of another. Such awareness is demonstrated by Viktor Frankel's depictions of life in concentration camps. This is an extreme case where the officers who ran the camps would immediately condemn to death anyone who showed self and other respect, dignity and honor, thus revealing the lack of honor and dignity in the very officers – and all degraded to a mere value for the state. This logic calls to the others to recognize the crisis in their lives, to legitimate the life world in which they live and to ask whether such a life world fulfills their lived awareness of their intrinsic worth. This is to say, the very presence of the other who is aware of her intrinsic worth performs a tacit phenomenological bracketing and hence challenges a blind inherence in this life world. One can then raise a question whether such a life world is worthy of one's intrinsic worth.

Intrinsic self worth, as a discovered given,

appears not only through degradations and oppressions, but also through actions demanding mutual recognition of self and other. And it appears irrespective of culture, historical period, or social standing. Gandhi angered colonial rulers by his bearing, his dignity, his dignifying those who were at the lowest social rung, his demand that the colonial rulers have truthfulness and honor and thus made them recognize their own intrinsic worth and not merely their value for the empire. Gandhi reminded all that the life world of an empire is illegitimate because it does not allow the fulfillment of the lived awareness of intrinsic worth. Hence he asked for legitimation of his own value in such a life world and whether he must rise to a transcendental level and reveal a crisis in his own life and that of the empire based on recognition of what is the ground of final human self awareness and all the values. While being an object of derision and quixotic depictions, he took the blows with dignity, demanding dignity from those who administered the blows. It is to be noted that he did not claim intrinsic self worth as a value of a specific culture, but as an unconditional and absolute ground that raises the question of legitimation of any life world and demands the fulfillment of transcendental awareness that correlates to self worth. Einstein once pondered the phenomenon of Gandhi by wondering "that such a person could have walked among us." In face of the intrinsic self worth of this slight person, the British Empire lost all of its moral, political, and military superiority.

We reached a juncture at which the founder of Western philosophy – Socrates – can make his entrance. Although scholars locate Socrates as the relentless seeker of truth, i.e. categorical epistemologist, we must also recall that the first condition of the search for truth is the good and a life world where a person

can live in accordance with the demands of the good as one expression of intrinsic worth. Only under these conditions that Socrates can search for truth as another aspect of intrinsic worth. After all, the search for truth was, for Socrates, a practical-existential commitment and activity of a good and truthful life. Thus Socrates, like many others, was an object of derision and caricatures. He accepted the Athenian verdict of death in order to show that his and others intrinsic worth demands a life world in which the search for truth cannot be forbidden. He placed his internal worth as the good above his personal life and could demand that such a good should be a part of his life world. The decision by the jury to forbid Socrates his daimon, his eros, to “philosophize” was equivalent to a destruction of a life world in which his intrinsic worth once had a place. Socrates is compelled to face a crisis and reveal a crisis of his life world. He reaches and lives an awareness that places his entire life world into question and demands a decision: Is the life world, offered by Athenians, adequate to fulfill his intrinsic self worth. In turn, are the Athenians, by their own action, degraded themselves to a level of social value where truth, dignity, honor, will have no place. After all, such a degradation to social value is obvious from the trial when Socrates is offered a chance to surrender his troublesome quest and thus become a valuable citizen, and when Socrates offers, ironically, to accept a pension from the state for “whatever little services that he might render.” Here appears a depiction of the first crisis of democracy and Socrates reaches a lived awareness which demands a legitimation of the life world which is being offered to him. Can his lived awareness, correlated as it is to intrinsic self worth, have any perceptual affirmation in such a life world? The latter, after all, demands self degradation and thus the

denial of self worth. Socrates resolves the crisis by accepting the verdict of the Athenians with a warning: If you condemn me, my fame will spread far and wide; do not do this, because it will be forever a black mark on Athens.

The responsibility of an intellectual is to raise the question of the legitimacy of any life world with respect to the lived fulfillment of intrinsic self worth. Here, all cultural value constructs as to what human being is are rendered transparent as to their arbitrariness and inadequacy, demanding the recognition that despite the variation of cultures and their values, there is a transcendental trace of self and other worth that is taken for granted even if not recognized. Such recognition is the limit which cannot be transgressed without making cultures and their values meaningless.

What was given in modern Western as a background awareness, is now in the foreground of the life world of enlightenment and the unfolding of the constructive-valuative intentionality that has become prevalent. Being in the foreground or “positional” and thematized this awareness points to the problem of legitimation and to the illegitimate ways that the basic awareness became obfuscated, degraded, perverted, and empty. It questions the claim of this life world to be the only legitimate reality. This claim to sole reality appears only when the self worth becomes a foreground, enacted by a singular being in quest for an authentic fulfillment of self worth in a life world that at one stroke is made inactive, placed out of play. On the background of the life world that is placed out of play in its totality there appears a quest to act in favor of a world that would contain self worth. With the placing out of play, the life world without human worth is exposed to temporality: it becomes **chronoscopic**, i.e. an inadequate temporal perspective on the reality of the essence of the human. Such

temporalization suggests that there is an **atemporal, non-positional** awareness which, inevitably can appear only chronoscopically. It is equally important to note that **since the disclosure of self worth revealed it to be solely as activity and not accessible through categorical intuition, then honor, dignity, nobility, truthfulness and justice appear only as enacted phenomena and hence have validity to the extent of their enactment. In addition, the striving to enact intrinsic worth is also a chronoscopic awareness, since no single activity, whether honorable, noble or truthful, does not fulfill the entirety of the search for self worth.** As an activity for its own sake, self worth also demands, as already suggested, public domain wherein such activity can be performed, resulting in the notion that such a domain is to be maintained for its own sake. Both, self worth and public domain are phenomena that mutually require one another and hence are to be maintained as purposes in themselves.

Yet even the awareness of such purposes in themselves requires one more domain of

awareness. The disclosure of intrinsic worth as atemporally present, but only chronoscopically experienced, requires a specific constitution of activity. As we know, awareness is oriented toward the world. Yet such orientation is experienced reflectively, such that the world becomes represented and the self becomes represented as awareness that is turned toward the world. In view of her orientation as intentional aim, she also finds confronted by herself. Such orientation toward the world in face of oneself is the **ESSENCE OF ACTIVITY**. Given the awareness of such activity, the latter places another demand: not only reflection that represents an aim toward the world and the one who intends such an aim, but above all asks for legitimation as to the **worth of such an action**. At this level one does not ask whether such a world is known – this is already granted, but is this world worthy of one's activity. The possibility of constituting a worthy life world is the reflective condition from which the failures of our degraded life world become visible.

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GLOBALIZACIJA IR INTELEKTINĖ ATSAKOMYBĖ

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Santrauka

Straipsnyje apmąstomas globalizacijos, intelektualumo ir atsakomybės santykis. Autorius pasirenka itin aktualų minėtos problemos sprendimo atspirties tašką – šiuolaikinį filosofinį diskursą. Intelektinės atsa-

komybės ir globalizacijos fenomeno santykis postmodernybės sąlygomis reikalauja aptarimo atsigręžiant į geografinės filosofijos ištakas – Senovės Graikiją. Intelektinės atsakomybės klausimas glūdi dar Sokrato

keltame filosofijai uždavinyje. Globalizacijos kontekste pati intelektinė atsakomybė tampa problemiška, nes šios problemos sprendimas išskiriant vien postmoderniosios situacijos pagrindinius aspektus yra nepakankamas. Globalizacijos fenomeną svarbu apmąstyti bandant išvelgti jo ontologinį, metafizinį, teologinį, psichologinį pamatus. Diagnozuoti pasaulio homogenizaciją nesigilinant į atskirų tautų ir kultūrų tapatybių raidos tendencijas ir nusistovėjusias tradicijas pernelyg neatsakinga. Todėl būtina prisiminti Sokrato intelektualinio kuklumo bei saiko pavyzdį ir nuolat juo remtis apmąstant globalizacijos reiškinių, taip pat nepamiršti Aristotelio *akto* ir *potencijos*, Descar-

tes'o sąmonės ir kūno dualizmo, Kanto *daikto savaimė* ir radikaliojo Hegelio principo (esą tapatu yra nebe mintis ir būtis, bet minties ir būties refleksija), marksizmo ir kapitalizmo utopijų. Straipsnyje kvestionuojama homogenizuojanti globalizacijos įtaka, iškeliant skirtingų kultūrinių tapatybių būtinybę. Klausima, ar globalizacijos logika turi tvirtą metafizinį pagrindą, ar yra tik nepagrįsta pretenzija redukuoti visas kultūras į vieną pasaulinę kultūrą, taip atmetant bet kokią intelektinės atsakomybės galimybę.

Reikšminiai žodžiai: homogenizacija, metafizinis globalizacijos pagrindas, ontologinis svarstymas, tapatybė, universalumas.

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