

“De-liberated”, Stigmatised and “Ungrateful”: Practices of Bolshevik “Re-Sovietization” of Ukraine and Ukrainians (1943 – early 1950s)

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ABSTRACT. The purpose of this article is to analyse the first steps of “liberation” and restoration of the pre-war status quo for the Bolshevik government in Ukraine. The task is to find out what practices of “liberation” the people experienced under the Soviet occupation; in what way did the Bolsheviks react to the revitalisation of the national idea; how re-Sovietisation became the foundation for the restoration of the Russian imperial order; how Ukraine became a kind of a bridgehead for reinventing the model of Soviet imperialism in its “Russo-centric” posture.

In this text, re-Sovietisation will be considered as the mechanisms and practices (together with the tools) of the Bolshevik government in relation to Ukrainian communities that came out of the war with intentions of public solidarity and the ability to resist, which was dangerous for the Kremlin.

The source base of the work includes archival documents of central authorities, security services, memoirs, statistical data and correspondence. The methodological basis is the concept of agency, which implies the ability to choose options for people’s own life under any circumstances.

Conclusions: right at the first stages of returning to Ukrainian lands, the Bolsheviks resumed the repressive and marauding practices that were widespread before World War II. Through condemnation and repressive policy, a blow was struck on the Ukrainian national revival. Due to broad campaigns against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” and for “gratitude to the Russian people for liberation”, Ukrainians were “pushed aside” both as victims and as heroes of World War II.

KEYWORDS: Re-Sovietisation, marauders, Ukrainian nationalism, repression, Russian imperialism.

Introduction

The expulsion of the Nazis from the territory of Ukraine, which began in 1943 and ended on 28 October 1944, was a difficult yet not ultimate victory for the Ukrainian people. The Nazi occupation was overcome; yet instead, Soviet colonialism expanded and acquired numerous symbolic and political possessions, and claimed the title of "saviour of the world from fascism".

The challenges of restoring and establishing Soviet power on Ukrainian lands related to quite pragmatic difficulties, including catastrophic demographic losses¹, management crises and shortage of personnel, destruction of industrial facilities and housing², and large numbers of homeless children³. On the other hand, the specifics of the re-Sovietisation of the Ukrainian lands took place in a new symbolic framework, where the Second World War, titled the "Great Patriotic War" by the Soviets, marked a new starting point, a kind of the "zero" point in the creation of the USSR as a Soviet empire. Within this framework, the place of Ukrainians as "younger brothers" was marked in a wide symbolic range – from front-line soldiers and partisans dissolved in the "Russian Soviet" people to helpless victims of Nazism and up to uncertain, unstable "nationalists", always ready to betray their saviours.

The term "re-Sovietiation", which is used in the title and body of the text, reflects the author's view of the socio-political processes that took place in Ukraine in the last ten years of Stalin's life. I will consider the Ukrainian lands as those that were subjected to Russian occupation: some of them were occupied in 1918–1920, others in 1939 and then in 1944. These occupations were politically defined as the "establishment of the Soviet system" (or rather forced establishment – O. S). For those lands that came under the power of Moscow in 1918–1920, the occupation acquired prolonged transformational features of colonial policy in the mid-1920s, when the collaboration of a part of the local population turned into a conscious or forced participation in strengthening the Kremlin regime. For the western territories, the scenario of negative transformation of the Soviet model was interrupted in

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¹ In the period from January 1941 to January 1, 1945, the population of the Ukrainian republic decreased from 40 million 967 thousand to 27 million 383 thousand. Data from: *Bezsmertia. Kryha Pamiaty Ukrainy. 1941–1945*, Head of the Editorial Board I. O. Herasymov, deputy heads I. T. Mukovskiyi, P. P. Panchenko, R. H. Vyshnevskiyi, Kyiv, 2000, p. 561.

² Some 16 100 industrial enterprises were destroyed, including 599 heavy and medium engineering plants, 28 metallurgical and 25 coke-chemical plants, 882 mines of the Donetsk coal basin, and hundreds of enterprises in other industries. During the war, 10 main railways, 5.6 thousand railway bridges, 1.8 thousand railway stations and stations were disabled. 33 000 school premises, universities, technical schools, research institutes, 18 000 medical institutions, many theatres, museums and other cultural institutions were destroyed. Data from: *Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrainiskoi RSR*, in 3 volumes, vol. 3, book 1, Kyiv, 1985, pp. 165–168.

³ From 1941 to May 1943, 190,000 children lost contact with their parents. Data from: I. V. Malovichko, "Podolannia dytiachoi bezprytnosti ta bezdohliadnosti v 1935–1945 rokakh 20 stolittia na terytorii Ukrainy", in: *Porivnialno-analitychne pravo*, no. 3-1, 2013, p. 52.

1941 by no less negative attempts to install Nazi colonialism. In 1944, the prolonged Soviet occupation began for the second time, and later it also acquired the features of colonial policy, supported not just by foreigners sent from the metropolis, but local residents as well. The subjectivity and capacity of those Ukrainians who fought for the independence of Ukraine and those who surrendered (or who knowingly or unknowingly agreed with Moscow's policy under the influence of aggressive or offensive propaganda) was emphasised. This means sharing the responsibility for the historical wounds that were inflicted on Ukrainians as well as by Ukrainians during the restoration of the Soviet regime.

The purpose of this text is to analyse the first steps of "liberation" and the restoration of the pre-war status quo for the Bolshevik government through violence and repression. It includes the suppression of the tendencies of Ukrainians to discover their own destiny, their own strength and their own capacity, and the taming of society, which – according to Catherine Beck – "though with some regional differences, but restored pre-revolutionary values and experienced national revitalisation again"⁴. In this text, re-Sovietisation will be considered as the mechanisms and practices (as well as tools) of the Bolshevik government towards Ukrainian communities that came out of the war with intentions of public solidarity and the ability to resist, which was dangerous for Kremlin. The text will show how Ukraine became a bridgehead, a springboard for reinventing the model of Soviet imperialism in its "Russian-centric" posture.

First steps

Peaceful life in European countries began, mainly, with the legitimisation or delegitimisation – through lynching or trials, and elections – of the apparatus of municipalities and governments⁵. On the territory of Ukraine, it began with the mission of "cleansing" (sometimes aggressive rapid "sanitation") of territories from "enemy" elements, assigned to special structures of the People's Committee of Internal Affairs (Rus. *Народный комиссариат внутренних дел*, NKVD). It is noteworthy that these structures – operational Chekist groups of the NKVD – were first used in 1939 in recently incorporated lands of Western Ukraine. Back in 1939 they were assigned to take the premises of (local) communication institutions, banks and printing houses, for example. In addition, operative Chekist groups were supposed to arrest and take hostages of famous politicians, landowners and government officials, create agent networks, control strategic objects and ensure public order. After all, it was they who became the first occupation structure the residents of Western Ukraine encountered.

⁴ Katrin Bek, "Vidnovlennia stalinskoï systemy v poviennii USSR", in: *Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, 2012, no. 4, p. 131.

⁵ Cf. István Deák, Norman M. Naimark, *Europe on Trial: The Story of Collaboration, Resistance and Retribution during World War II*, Westview Press, 2015, p. 288.

The use of task forces in the territories from which the Nazis were expelled recently, demonstrated how "native" and "homegrown" the Soviet authorities considered themselves to be in the Ukrainian territories. Entering the cities and villages together with the advanced units of the army, the operational groups received and implemented the powers associated with the formation of the first lists of "traitors" and "helpers" based on "fresh traces", and their arrest (or in their absence – the arrest of the family)⁶.

The first "acts of liberation" the local population faced, were large-scale robberies. Looting in "their own" Ukrainian territories – that is, those that were part of the USSR since 1922 – had very specific scenarios, the perpetrators of which imitated and reflected the pre-war practices of lawlessness. Red Army soldiers robbed the "liberated" Ukrainian population not only because they considered the property of civilian residents as trophies, but also under the guise of raids made on behalf of the NKVD against "suspicious people" or under the pretext of "seizing property". The Soviet state provided patterns of looting through unforgettable slogans and actions such as those regarding "loot what was looted", confiscation of bread and property of the peasants, and "disarmament", etc.

It was these practices of repressive behaviour – common for post-Soviet Ukrainians – imitated by the robbers of the law enforcement agencies that opened the door of any home without any resistance. In the report note addressed to the NKVD Commissar Lavrentyi Beria, a significant number of facts of looting in the city of Kharkiv with similar scenarios were recorded. Thus, on 28 August 1943 "5 military personnel who identified themselves as soldiers of the NKVD entered the apartment of citizen Serhii Hrytsenko, searched and took a pocket watch, a ladies' watch, gold earrings, three gold rings and other valuables"⁷; on 28 August 1943, at the apartment of M. S. Vazhnevich, "two servicemen came in and pretending to be representatives of counter-intelligence forces, conducted a search, took a significant amount of household items as well as valuables, and left after firing several shots"⁸.

"Looting and robberies", wrote the People's Commissar of internal affairs of the Ukrainian SSR Riasnyi in August 1943, "were carried out by Red Army soldiers under the guise of finding trophy property from local residents." On 26 August 1943 two servicemen came to Lukeriia Khmelevska (Kharkiv) and, under the pretext of seizing trophy property, took 680 roubles, money, a coat, watch and passport; on 26 August 1943 a stopwatch, officer's belt and 2 kg of sugar were taken from Nagorna Oleksandra (Kharkiv) by three

⁶ Cf. Yuryi T. Tereshchenko, "Orhanizatsiia vidnovlennia diialnosti orhaniv NKVS na terytorii Ukrainy, zvilnenii vid okupatsii pid chas druhoi svitovoi viiny", in: *Pivdennoukrainskyi pravnychyi chasopys*, 2016, no. 2, pp. 193–197.

⁷ A report about cases of marauding in city of Kharkov and struggle with it, 31 August 1943, in: *Departmental State Archive of Security Service of Ukraine (Haluzevyi Derzhavnyi arkhiv Sluzhby bezpeky Ukrainy, hereinafter – DSA SSU)*, fond 16, op. 1, file 540, sheet 32.

⁸ *Ibid.*, sheet 47.

servicemen, two of whom were armed with machine guns, under the same pretext⁹. On 12 September 1943, according to a report to the NKVD, Pelagiia Tkachenko, a resident of the Kryvorizhzhia mine in the Voroshylovhrad region (now Luhansk), "was robbed of her clothing: 4 pairs of women's underwear, 2 pairs of galoshes, 2 pairs of men's underwear, men's boots and other things"¹⁰.

On the Ukrainian lands, from which the Nazis were driven out recently, the Soviet soldiers took everything that had value in their eyes: money, watches, gramophones, flour, alcohol, personal belongings including used ones, cows (which they then ate), fabrics, glasses, blankets, bed linen and dishes, etc.

In addition to hunting for trophy property (which in no case could be considered a trophy on supposedly their own, Soviet, territory) the soldiers performed rapes and murders: "On 28 August 1943 in the village of KhPZ (Kharkiv), soldier Belozarov came to the apartment of Vasyleva and killed her husband Mykhailo Sovetskyi"¹¹; "On 23 September 1943 two military servicemen entered the apartment of the wife of a Red Army soldier Stepanida Kotliar, who lives in the village of Velyka Danylivka, Kharkiv region, and raped her under the threat of being shot"¹²; "on the night of 1 January, 1944, the guard sergeant of the fighter aviation regiment of the 8th Kyiv Guards Division, Andriy Petrovych Polunin, shot a five-year-old girl Valentyna Balaban with a machine gun and seriously wounded her mother, Oleksandra Semenivna Balaban, who lived in Byshiv, Kyiv region."¹³; "On the night of 5 January, 1944, the fighter signalman Mykhailo Prokopovych Sychikov demanded that Pelagiia Zhdan had sex with him, and when she did not agree, Sychikov broke the furniture in the apartment, grabbed a rifle, jumped out of the house and killed Zhdan by a shot through the window, then he hid."¹⁴

In exactly the same scenarios, Soviet soldiers continued to kill and rape in "liberated" Lviv, sometimes getting involved in the summary of the criminal situation in the city: "... in January 1945, military serviceman S. P. Kopiehanov killed Razdolska and took 50,000 rubles of money"¹⁵. Such actions of Soviet servicemen did not stop even after the war: on

⁹ *Ibid.*, sheets 31, 31v.

¹⁰ To People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR, General Commissar of State Security comrade Beria L. P., in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 540, sheet 103.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, sheet 32v.

¹² To a secretary of CC CPU(b) com. Korotchenko. A report. About illegal actions and criminal actions committed by servicemen, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 534, sheet 26–27.

¹³ To a secretary of CC CPU(b) com. Khrushchov. Information about liquidation of robbery-stealing groups in the city of Kyiv. January 18, 1944, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 545, sheet 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, sheet 8.

¹⁵ Letters and appeals of working people and materials to the latter from A to E. January 1945 – December 1945, in: *Central State Archives of Public Associations of Ukraine (Центральний державний архів громадських об'єднань, hereinafter – CSA PAU)*, fond 1, op. 41, file 2, sheet 40.

27 December 1945, Soviet soldiers raped and beat a girl from Drohobych, who went mad after the crime¹⁶. From 26 December 1945 to 5 January 1946, a group of servicemen of the 26th VOS NKO (the name of a military base) robbed, tortured and killed residents of the city and villages in the town of Sambir, Drohobych region: the robbed priest of the Sambir church was injured by thieves in three places and his ribs were broken; in the village of Volia-Baranetska, "red thieves" robbed and killed a resident of the village named Hrytsek and his daughter, and seriously injured his wife; "in the village of Voskovychi they robbed and killed a 65-year-old woman"¹⁷.

On 23 August 1950 (!) in the city of Pryluky, Chernihiv Region, two soldiers of a military unit tried to rob a woman, a worker, A. N. Levchenko, and at the same time they beat her badly on the head¹⁸.

The scale of looting committed on the territory of Ukraine during the entire period of re-Sovietization cannot be accurately assessed. First, the number of those who filed a complaint was much smaller than the number of actual victims. People were afraid to complain, because the stigma of "occupied" (that meant traitors) destroyed trust in them in the eyes of the repressive authorities. Complaints could be afforded only by "socially similar class" such as workers, heads of collective farms, wives of Red Army soldiers and partisans. However, the scale – even with an incomplete picture of the crimes – was so impressive that the reaction to them was the order of the People's Commissar of Defence: "On atrocities, armed robberies, thefts from the civilian population and murders committed by individual servicemen in the front line, and measures against them" dated 30 May 1944. The order provided for the introduction of strict control over the behaviour of servicemen and the consideration of offenders' cases by a military tribunal¹⁹. However, these efforts did little to change the actual situation. Thus, looking at the correspondence of the residents of Ukraine with the front-line soldiers and/or with each other only in December 1945, the Military Censorship of the People's Commissariat for State Security (Rus. *Народный комиссариат государственной безопасности*, NKGB) of the Ukrainian SSR discovered 926 letters "in which there were reports of cases of banditry and robberies in several regions of the republic"²⁰, performed by the Red Army soldiers.

¹⁶ An official report about revealing correspondence in the mail of notifications about the cases of gangsterism and plundering that have become more frequent, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 0561, sheet 206.

¹⁷ Special information. About facts of gangster display from the side of servicemen in Drohobych oblast. January 25, 1946, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 566, sheets 205, 207.

¹⁸ Special information. About bandit-rowdy displays of servicemen in Lutsk Rayon. August 23, 1950, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 766, sheet 177.

¹⁹ *Russkyi arkhiv. Velykaia Otechestvennaia. Prykazy narodnoho komyssara oborony SSSR. (1943–1945)*, Moscow: Terra, 1997, pp. 290–292.

²⁰ An official report. About revealing in the mail correspondence of notifications about the cases of gangsterism and plundering that have become more frequent, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 16, op. 1, file 0561, sheet 125.

Attempts at punishment

Deprived of its subjectivity, the government of Soviet Ukraine was instructed to return to the "liberated territory" at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union CPSU (Bolsheviks) (CC CPSU(b)) that was held at the end of January 1943 in Moscow. In the first "queue", which was supposed to leave for Ukraine on 25 January, according to the regulations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CC CPU(b)), the entire body of only one structural unit – the Department of Propaganda and Agitation – went to Ukraine²¹. In the end, it was the combination of the activities of the operational Chekist groups, which were the first to enter the conquered lands with systematic actions of propaganda and agitation, that was the instrument that launched the entire mechanism of re-Sovietisation.

It is also noteworthy that in the first "government cortege" the editorial staff of the newspaper *For Soviet Ukraine* (*За Радянську Україну*), as well as some of the employees of the newspapers *Communist* (*Комуніст*) and *Soviet Ukraine* (*Советская Украина*) were sent to Ukraine. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian headquarters of the partisan movement, with the exception of a few people, remained in Moscow awaiting "special orders"²². The real power over Soviet Ukraine, just like in the 1920s and 1930s, was in the Kremlin.

Liberated from Nazism, the inhabitants of the Ukrainian territories found themselves in a situation when the Soviet government, which previously did nothing to protect or evacuate them, returned – on the one hand, to punish real and imaginary traitors, and on the other hand – to restore "Sovietness" with all its rituals and symbols. Under such circumstances, the thirst for revenge and justice, which marked the moods of all those freed from the occupation of European communities, turned hatred into a civic duty in the Soviet version²³, made it a version of a legal activity and channelled it in a way necessary for the recovery of the Soviet regime. From December 1941 to August 1944, a number of directives and prescriptions of the NKVD and the Prosecutor's Office were adopted: a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR (19 April 1943); several departmental resolutions and explanations of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor of the USSR; orders of the Council of People's Deputies of the USSR; and a joint circular from the NKGB and the Prosecutor of the USSR, which related to the qualification of various forms of cooperation

²¹ Protocol of the meeting of CC CPU(b). 1. Questions related to the moving of the Government of Ukraine on the territory of Ukraine, in: *The Central State Archive of Higher Authorities and Administration of Ukraine* (Центральний державний архів вищих органів влади та управління України, hereinafter – CSA HAAU), fond P-2, op. 12, file 0561, sheet 125.

²² *Ibid.*, sheet 2.

²³ Serhii Yekelchuk, *Povsiakdennyi stalinizm. Kyiv i kyiany pislia Velykoi viiny*, Kyiv: Laurus, 2018, p. 20.

of the civilian population with the occupation authorities²⁴. In addition, all these "fundamental" documents regarding the assessment of the behaviour of people under occupation also created certain standards and frameworks of ideas about what could not be done under the occupation, and what qualified as terrible crimes before the Soviet authorities. These documents also created a verbal logic for describing human behaviour: words filled the space through mass media, stories about conversations with investigators, movies and fiction. The synonymous list of "betrayal" (зрада) was replenished with words such as "accomplice" (поплічник), "supporter" (посіпака) and, "assistant" (пособник), etc. When, in the middle of 1944, the Red Army encountered the resistance of the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Українська повстанська армія, УПА) in Western Ukraine, the vocabulary of "enemies" was enriched with the term "Ukrainian-German nationalists". For example, in November 1944 at the plenum of the Central Committee of the CPU(b), Nikita Khrushchev called the formations of Ukrainian soldiers "gangs" (Рус. банды), "Hitler's henchmen", "German agents", "spypacks of German imperialists" and more, etc.²⁵. As part of the legalisation of hatred, which was formed, including through the main Ukrainian party magazine Bolshevik of Ukraine (Більшовик України), "Ukrainian-German nationalists" were labelled as "the fiercest enemies of the Ukrainian people"²⁶, the strongest curse after "fascist invaders".

During 1943–1945, 45 027²⁷ people were arrested and convicted for "treason to the Homeland" by the NKVD authorities on Ukrainian lands (in total, 93 590²⁸ people for 1943–1953 were labelled as "traitors of the Homeland and their followers"). In relative numbers (the number of arrestees to the total population), it was less than in Belgium (450 000 cases were opened, 60 000 cases were brought to court, for which 49 000 people were sentenced to various degrees of punishment²⁹. In Norway, by the end of the 1940s accord-

²⁴ Cf. Tamara V. Vronska, "Rezhymno-obmezhuvanni zakhody orhaniv na vyzvolenni terytorii Ukrainy pid chas Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny ta v pershi povoienni roky", in: *Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy. Zb. nauk. statei*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, In-t istorii Ukrainy, 1997, pp. 125–142; Tamara V. Vronska, "Femida voiennoi doby i tsyvilne naselennia", in: *Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy. Zb. nauk. statei*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, In-t istorii Ukrainy, 1999, pp. 100–119; Tamara V. Vronska: "Fenomen 'posobnystva': do problemy kvalifikatsii spivpratsi tsyvilnoho naselennia z okupantamy u pershyi period Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny", in: *Storinky voiennoi istorii Ukrainy. Zb. nauk. statei*, Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, In-t istorii Ukrainy, 2008, pp. 88–97.

²⁵ A report of the first secretary of CC CPU(b) com. Khrushchov on the plenum of CC CP(b)U November 22–24, 1944, in: CSA HAAU, fond 1, op. 1, file 667, sheets 10–13, 23–24.

²⁶ O. Kasysmenko, "Ukrainsko-nimetski natsionalisty – nailiutishi vorohy ukrainskoho narodu", in: *Bilshovyk Ukrainy*, 1944, no. 11, pp. 8–24.

²⁷ V. M. Nikolskyi, *Represyva diialnist orhaniv derzhavnoi bezpeky SRSR v Ukraini (kinets 1920–1950-kh rr): istoryko-statystychni doslidzhennia*, Donetsk, 2003, pp. 510–511.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 206–224, 451–452.

²⁹ Pieter Lagrou, „Historical trials: getting the past right – or the future?“, *The Scene of the Mass Crime. History, Film and International Tribunals*. Ed. Delage C. and Goodrich P., London: Routledge, 2013, p. 9–22, [online]: http://www.academia.edu/4497422/_Historical_trials_getting_the_past_right_or_the_future_

ing to István Deák, 92 805 people (4% of the country's population) were tried, 17 000 of which were sent to prisons for various terms of imprisonment. During this period, in the Netherlands with a population of almost 9 million people, 150 000 people were suspected of collaboration, 60 000 were imprisoned by court decision, 152 people were sentenced to death, but only 40 of them were executed³⁰. During the same period, 300 000 citizens of Hungary were punished in one way or another – from imprisonment to the ban on holding positions. In Austria, 130 000 cases of war criminals and collaborators were investigated; 23 000 people went to trial, of which 13 600 people were found guilty³¹.

However, the smaller number of "occupied" Ukrainians punished for collaboration did not in any way attest to the softening of the Soviet repressive system. The smaller number of people punished compared to European countries was caused by purely pragmatic challenges. One of those was the need for a second wave of military mobilisation and replenishment of the Red Army³², and the need to rebuild industry and agriculture, oriented – first of all – to the needs of the army³³. The total repression of the occupied/liberated people was ill-timed in those years. Moreover, the morale and fighting qualities of the troops were such a priority for the Soviet authorities that the state security authorities began advocating for the behaviour of the wives and relatives of soldiers and commanders during the occupation. In December 1943, the instructions of the NKGB of the USSR were sent to the People's Commissars of State Security of the Union and autonomous republics, the heads of the state security departments of the districts and regions, and the heads of the military censorship departments of the fronts. It referred to the need to take preventive actions regarding letters to the active army, which reported on the immoral behaviour of the wives and relatives of soldiers. Such notes were called "provocative" and "aiming at undermining combat capability [of army men]". "In order to stop such methods of anti-Soviet work" it was proposed to confiscate those letters, and to search for and arrest their authors³⁴.

³⁰ István Deák, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

³¹ Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe", *The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath*, I. Deák, J. T. Gross and T. Judt (eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, p. 301.

³² According to Ukrainian researchers, during the second wave of mobilisation from Ukrainian territories, from 2.7–3 million to 4 million people were mobilised to join the ranks of the Red Army. For more details see: Ludmyla Rybchenko, "Radianski viiskovi mobilizatsii na terytorii Ukrainy u 1941–1945 rr.", *Ukraina v Druhii svitovii viini: pohliad z XXI stolittia. Istorychni narysy*, ed. col.: V. A. Smolii (head of the collegium) and others, book 1, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, NAN Ukrainy, 2011, p. 316.

³³ On the eve of the war, the industrial and production personnel of the Ukrainian SSR numbered 2.6 million people, while in 1945 it was only 1.3 million people. For more details see: Volodymyr K. Baran, "Ukraina u pershomu povoiennomu desiatylitti (1946–1955)" (Chapter 29), *Ekonomichna istoriia Ukrainy: Istoryko-ekonomichne doslidzhennia*, in 2 volumes, ed. collegium: V. M. Lytvyn (chief), H. V. Boryak, V. M. Heiets et al., resp. ed. V. A. Smolii, vol. 2, Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2011, p. 367.

³⁴ A letter of NKGB USSR to the peoples' commissars of state security, heads of departments of state security of the regions and oblasts, heads of departments of military censorship, December 12, 1943, in: *DSA SSU*, fond 9, file 18, sheet 41.

This willingness "not to see" any signs of bad/non-Soviet behaviour in the behaviour of the wives and relatives of the soldiers was a completely rational strategy and in no way meant a softening of the regime. Families of the military, according to a number of resolutions, directives and instructions from 1941–1943, remained hostages. In case of betrayal by soldiers and commanders of the homeland (and even in the case of "treasonous thoughts"), switching to the enemy's side, being captured, etc., were subject to arrest and exile³⁵.

Therefore, as potential hostages, who were a significant factor of influence on the behaviour of men mobilised into the army – and as resources of the "labour front", – de-occupied and not repressed en masse people were "more useful" for the Bolshevik authorities. In addition, the stigmatisation of unpunished, not even arrested but still uncertain and suspicious citizens due to their stay in the occupied territories, remained part of the policy of marginalisation of Ukrainians for decades.

On the other hand, hatred, legitimised by the Soviet propaganda and which was supposed to be felt in relation to the "enemies" did not coincide with the understanding of the non-linearity, multifacetedness of human experiences of survival in the occupation. And so people preferred to show hatred rather than actually feel it; it is noteworthy that even the main enemy – the Germans – sometimes did not cause the desired or expected hatred, which could be used as a mobilisation mechanism³⁶. Created and revived systems (spatial, professional, gender, national) of local solidarity, practices of survival together, experience of cooperation with the enemy and systems of passive resistance contributed to communities mostly preferring to keep their own and other people's secrets about "wrong behaviour" in order not to be exposed to repressive actions of the Bolshevik authorities, and sometimes even had the power to resort to defence against "unfairly convicted" colleagues, neighbours and relatives.

Stigmatising of everything Ukrainian

Threats to social solidarity, which is slow and uncertain, nonetheless appeared as a common result of the Nazi/Romanian/Soviet occupation and front-line life for a significant number of people. These were reinforced in Ukrainian territories by the obvious threat to national unity for the Kremlin, the understanding of its own – different from the Russian/international/Soviet – path of survival and victory in the war. The carriers of this under-

³⁵ Tamara Vronska, *Upokroennia strakhom: simeine zaruchnytstvo*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2013, pp. 272–302.

³⁶ Serhii Yekelchuk drew attention to the fact that the party officials were worried about the actions and statements of the people of Kyiv towards the Germans, who were taken through the streets of Kyiv on 16 August 1943. For example, from an apartment on Horvitsi Street, bread and a bundle of shaggy hair were thrown into the column of Germans, comments were heard such as: "Not everyone among them went to murders, abuses and other things out of desire, but according to Hitler's will", "look what they are overgrown, thin, dirty, ragged. They also left wives and children who are waiting for them". Quoted from: Serhii Yekelchuk, *Povsiakdennyi stalinizm...*, p. 32.

standing were not only members of the *Організація українських націоналістів* (OUN) and soldiers of the UPA and ordinary Ukrainians, but also glorified Ukrainian artists who seemed to be completely loyal to the authorities. In the winter of 1944, a reception for the Ukrainian delegation took place in Moscow, at which Stalin severely criticised the Oleksandr Dovzhenko film script *Ukraine on Fire* (*Україна у огні*). The Kremlin leader was most irritated by the fact that “in his scenario, Dovzhenko depicted Ukrainians fighting for liberation of their country but ignored other nations”. In addition, as the outraged leader noted:

Dovzhenko ignored the class nature of the Patriotic war of the Soviet people against the German invaders, “humiliated” Communist Party members, Red Army commanders, portraying them as dry, callous misanthropes, and instead magnified and made the scenario of vacillating people main heroes.³⁷

The lack of images of “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalists” was called a “huge sin” by Dovzhenko. This allowed Stalin to conclude that Dovzhenko himself was “sick of nationalism”³⁸.

The treatment of “Ukrainian nationalism” was one of the main tasks of the re-Sovietization of Ukrainian lands. It took place through various actions, both repressive and “educational” actions, the implementation of which required the restoration of the party-management apparatus. This took place in the Ukrainian SSR in conditions of an acute shortage of personnel and inspections of local communists for their behaviour under the Germans, in particular, “their registration in the bodies of the occupation authorities”. During the total check for collaboration with the enemy this included, as Iryna Sklokina notes, “all party and Komsomol members who remained in the occupied territory, as well as all those who claimed to improve their social status through higher education or holding positions in the management apparatus”³⁹. This was despite the fact that in 1943–1945 and for many post-war years in the reporting documentation of the HR departments of the party committees there was even a special section for: “Who stayed in the occupied territory without special tasks”, where the exact number of such persons who held nomenclature positions was indicated⁴⁰. Considerations of personal cases proceeded at different rates and with varying degrees of “punitive” effectiveness. Renewal of people in the party or Komsomol ranks was, on the one hand, a manifestation of “incorrect kindness”, from the point of view of repres-

³⁷ Operational report of the 4th Department of NKGB of Ukrainian SSR about reception by General Secretary of CC UKP(b) J. Stalin regarding examination of a film script by A. Dovzhenko *Ukraine on Fire*, 6 April 1944, in: DSA SSU, fond 11, file. C-836, vol. 3, sheets 23, 23v.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Iryna Sklokina, “Radianska polityka pamiaty pro kolaboratsiiu periodu natsyystskoi okupatsii yak instrument natsionalnoi polityky pamiaty: rehionalnyi aspekt”, 21-06-2013, [online], in: <http://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/za-but-i-zertvy-viyny/749-iryna-sklokina-radyanska-polityka-pamyati-pro-kolaboratsiyu-periodu-natsyystskoyi-okupatsiyi-yak-instrument-natsionalnoi-polityky-rehionalnyy-aspekt-chastyna-1>

⁴⁰ V. V. Ivanenko, “Vidrodzhennia derzhavnoho upravlinnia v URSR (1943–1945)”, *Narysy istorii derzhavnoi sluzhby v Ukraini. sluzhby Ukrainy*, editors: S. V. Kulchytskyi (head of author’s group) et al., Kyiv: Nika-Tsentr, 2009, p. 425.

sive bodies. However, on the other hand, this renewal corresponded to the pragmatic task of staffing the liberated territories. At the June 1944 meeting of the secretaries of regional personnel committees under the CC CPU(b), major attention was paid to this issue. In response to the demands of personnel departments of party committees to receive from the Central Committee for nomenclature positions people who did not "taint" themselves by staying in the occupied territory, Khrushchev sharply stated: "...personnel secretaries need to restructure their attitude [...] Remember that we will not give you more people, and you will have to work with the people who remained in the occupied territory"⁴¹. Punishment of "tainted party members" still took place. Thus, according to Oleh Mozokhin, in 1943, 141 253 people were arrested throughout the USSR on various charges, including treason, espionage, sabotage, spreading panic rumours, and participation in anti-Soviet organisations, etc. Of these, representatives of the "apparatus" were 132 or 0.09%⁴²; in 1944, 103,532 people were arrested, of which 82 or 0.08%⁴³ were *apparatchiks*; in 1945, out of 112,348 arrested representatives of the party leadership, there were 73 or 0.065%⁴⁴ punished.

Such a "selective" approach and the small percentage of those in power who were punished, showed that the Bolshevik authorities tried to transfer their own guilt to the Nazis and their accomplices. (This was for the defeats of 1941–1942, for the panicked flight of nomenclature workers and for the failure of the organisation of systemic resistance). The "whitewashing" of communists and the silencing of stories about the unworthy behaviour of Soviet bureaucrats and party members during the occupation, aimed at the symbolic sanctification of the role of the party and Stalin personally in the victory over Nazism. This was in addition to the pragmatic tasks of restoring control and solving economic problems.

The leaders of the Central Committee of the CPU(b) tried to overcome the "disease of nationalism" with the help of flattering glorification of the "great Russian people". In a letter on the occasion of the "liberation of Ukraine" (October 1944), the Ukrainian party leaders conveyed "the whole nation's heartfelt gratitude [...] for the powerful and life-saving help provided to the people of Ukraine in the organising the resistance against the German invaders and the rallying of the people's forces to repel and defeat the enemy"⁴⁵. Letters to Stalin with many thanks to him for the liberation became part of the scripts of numerous rallies held at enterprises and institutions in Ukrainian cities. The most large-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

⁴² Counted according to: Oleh Mozokhin, "Statistika repressivnoi deiatelnosti orhanov bezopasnosti SSSR. 1943", in: *Proekt "Istoricheskie materialy"*, [online], in: <http://istmat.info/node/294>

⁴³ Counted according to: Oleh Mozokhin, "Statistika repressivnoi deiatelnosti orhanov bezopasnosti SSSR. 1944", in: *Proekt "Istoricheskie materialy"* [online], <http://istmat.info/node/295>

⁴⁴ Counted according to: Oleh Mozokhin, "Statistika repressivnoi deiatelnosti orhanov bezopasnosti SSSR. 1945", in: *Proekt "Istoricheskie materialy"* [online], <http://istmat.info/node/296>

⁴⁵ A letter of the first secretary of CC CPU(b) N. S. Khrushchov to General Secretary of CC CPSU(b) J. Stalin about the celebration of liberation of Ukraine, 13 October 1944, in: *CSA HAAU*, fond 1, op. 23, file 779, sheet 15.

scale action of thanksgiving was the campaign to collect signatures under the collective poem *A Word to Great Stalin from the People of Ukraine* (*Слово Великому Сталіну від українського народу*)⁴⁶. This was written by sixteen of the most famous Ukrainian poets by the order from the Ukrainian Communist Party leaders. As of 11 October 1944, 9 316 973 citizens of Ukraine had signed the letter. Serhii Yekelchuk notes that this signature campaign revealed several features of the restoration of the Stalinist regime, including the government's concern about the loyalty of the masses, belief in the effectiveness of grandiose political rituals and identification of the Soviet government with "Great Stalin". However, the collection of signatures was probably also aimed at ensuring that as many Ukrainians as possible found out and learned the correct formula of how to think and talk about the war. This included how and whom to remember, how to once again appear as a Soviet person and how to see themselves, their role and place of all Ukrainians in the war.

In the first years after the expulsion of the Nazis and in the following period, "gratitude" to Stalin and the Russian people took on forms that openly humiliated Ukrainians. This laid the groundwork for a deliberate reduction (even to the point of denial) of the role of Ukrainians in the victory over Nazism, which continued to be a trend in the imperial rhetoric of the Russian Federation and in the first decades of the 21st century.

The "Little Russian" or rather colonial nature of such glorifications forced the former People's Commissar of Education Oleksandr Shumskyi to write a letter to Stalin from Krasnoyarsk area, where he was in exile, in October 1945. In this letter he emphasised:

Nikita Khrushchev, in his lyrical ecstasy of Little Russia, talked not only about the "seniority" of the Russian nation over the Ukrainian one and about Russians helping the "little Ukrainian brother", but also howled about the gratitude of the Ukrainian people to the Russians, and for what? It turns out, he thanks for the clear mind, stable character and firm influence of the Russian people in human relations. [...] What then is the nation on whose behalf they say this – what is the Ukrainian nation? What is it without a clear mind, without a stable character, without a firm will, a nation of weak-willed, characterless fools who were saved by the intelligent and gentle Russian people – and thanks Russians for it?⁴⁷

Shumskyi was wrong when he tried to personalise Khrushche's guilt. In fact, Khrushchev was only implementing the strategy of the imperial vision of the USSR, which was initiated by the Kremlin in the late 1930s. As Serhii Yekelchuk rightly noted: "if in the twenties the USSR was a state of equal nationalities and unequal classes, then at the end of the thirties it turned into a state of equal classes and unequal nationalities, where the centre was increasingly identified with the Russian nation"⁴⁸. It is worth emphasising that it was

⁴⁶ Serhii Yekelchuk, *Povsiakdennnyi stalinizm...*, pp. 49–50.

⁴⁷ *State archive of Russian Federation* (hereinafter – SARF), fond P. 9401, op. 2, file 138, sheet 258–260 (a copy of the document from the personal archive of Tamara Vronska).

⁴⁸ Serhii Yekelchuk, *Imperia pamiaty. Rosiisko-ukrainski stosunki vadianskii istorychnii uivai*, Kyiv: Krytyka, 2008, pp. 19–20.

precisely the imperialist Russian power that manifested itself after the expulsion of the Nazis that Western Ukrainians – insurgents, intellectuals, and ordinary people – were defined and distinguished very clearly. In the Western Ukrainian lands this power was the essence of the Bolshevik euphemisms of the “struggle against bourgeois nationalism”, but also – through efforts to renew the old formula “Moscow is the Third Rome” – it was seen in completely imperialistic practices of the Soviets. Soviet ideologists acted towards the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) not only as Bolsheviks, but also as leaders of the Russian Empire. Communist ideology discredited and banned the very idea of the Church (which actually happened); however, as imperialists, they forcibly orthodoxised these lands, encouraging the reunification of the Greek Catholic Church with the Orthodox.

The scenario of the dissolution of the UGCC in the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church through the so-called reunification began to materialise in the spring of 1945. The UGCC priests H. Kostelnyk, A. Pelvetskyi and M. Melnyk, terrorised by the authorities, expressed their desire to break the union with Rome and join the Russian Orthodox Church in a letter to the Soviet People’s Commissariat of the Ukrainian SSR. On 8–10 March 1946, an initiative group led by Kostelnyk convened a Council in the Church of St George in Lviv, at which 216 delegates and 19 laymen adopted a resolution on the self-dissolution of the UGCC⁴⁹.

Contemporaries gave an accurate assessment of these events in a leaflet that was distributed among the rebels and residents of Western Ukraine:

The imperialist Russian greedy muzzle comes out of the bag already at the very beginning of the action against the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. [...] Because all of Stalin’s current policies lead to the fact that the Ukrainians will later be turned into manure for Russian imperialism and drown them once and for all in the Moscow sea. It is precisely the Russian Church that should help him in this.⁵⁰

Oppressions of Ukrainian culture

There was an intense and consistent struggle organised by the Kremlin against “Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism” among entirely Soviet artists, scientists, writers and journalists during 1944–1951⁵¹. In view of this, thoughts about the possibility of Ukrainians and

⁴⁹ Oleh Bazhan, “Osoblyvosti natsionalno-kulturnoho zhyttia v Ukraini v druhii polovyni 1940-kh rokiv”, in: *Naukovi zapysky*, vol. 22, part 1, 2003, pp. 142–143; for more details see: N. Shlikhta, “Ukrainian’ as ‘Non-Orthodox’: How Greek Catholics Were ‘Reunited’ with the Russian Orthodox Church, 1940s–1960s”, in: *State, Religion and Church*, 2015, no. 2, pp. 77–98.

⁵⁰ A postcard of OUN. July 1945, in: *State Archive of Ternopil Region* (hereinafter – SATR), fond П-1, op. 1, file 290, sheets 26, 26v.

⁵¹ “The repressive trend was reflected in a series of resolutions of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and their counterparts, adopted by the Central Committee of the CPU(b): “About the magazine *Vitchyzna*”, “About the magazine of satire and humor *Perets*”, “About the repertoire of drama and opera theatres Ukrainian SSR and measures to improve it”, “On the repertoire of self-activity of cultural and educational institutions”, “On distortions and errors in the coverage of the history of Ukrainian literature”, “On political errors and unsatisfactory work of the Institute of the History of Ukraine of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR”, etc. A total of 12 most significant resolutions on ideological issues were adopted in the period from 1946 to 1951”, data from: V. Danylenko, “Borotba z ‘ukrainskym burzhuaznym natsionalizmom””, *Politychnyi teror i teroryzm v Ukraini. XIX–XX stolittia: Istorychni narysy*, Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 2002, p. 711.

Ukrainian culture being stronger than the Kremlin allowed in the format of the "younger brother" concept were shared. In one way or another, such thoughts were shared not only by the insurgents who did not want to be "drowned in the Moscow sea", but also by the general public of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. These came out of the war "under the banner of Shevchenko, under the banner of Kulish"⁵², and therefore did not realise or did not take into account changes in the strategic ideological course.

The Soviet authorities proved the "falseness" of these opinions expressed in essays and scientific works through disciplinary and discriminatory practices, rituals of repentance and criticism/self-criticism – "terror by force and grace". There was revision of the Ukrainian dictionary⁵³, Ukrainian history and historical science, literature and films, through symbolic (as in the case of X Dovzhenko, O. Honchar, V. Sosiura, etc.) and physical punishments. As Viktor Danylenko noted:

Kolyma, Mordovia, Komi ASSR, Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk, Karaganda, Far East, Irkutsk, Kemerovo, Astrakhan – this is an incomplete list of cities and places where Ukrainian poets and writers, "bourgeois nationalists" were "re-educated" in prisons and concentration camps.⁵⁴

According to him, 200 Ukrainian writers were repressed during this period; a. As Werner Hahn proved, the Ukrainian intelligentsia became the first victim of *Zhdanovshchyna* (Zhdanov policy). The deputy head of the USSR Agitprop (propaganda department), Pyotr Fedoseyev, arrived in Kyiv to coordinate the first stage of the ideological purge at the end of June 1946 – two months before the publication of the infamous resolution "About the magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad*"⁵⁵. Serhii Yekelchuk drew attention to the different emphases that were placed on the exposure of the false policies of the magazines *Zvezda* and *Leningrad* (August 1946) and the organ of the Union of Soviet Writers of Ukraine, the

⁵² In his speech at a conference of Ukrainian writers in August 1946, K. Lytvyn, secretary of the Central Committee for Ideology, noted that "they falsely believed that the Party changed its policy during the war. After all, a lot was written about Alexander Nevsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, Bohdan Khmelnytskyi in order to rise patriotism in our people, then a number of patriotic appeals to the Ukrainian people were published, in which great attention was paid to highlighting the heroic traditions of our past, a small-format *Kobzar* was published, which were thrown behind the front line, many leaflets in which Shevchenko's work was used for purely propaganda purposes, so, some mistakenly concluded from all this that the liberation of Ukraine was going under the banner of Shevchenko, under the banner of Kulish. Forgive me for being harsh, but that's how it turned out. Comrades decided that all previous criticism can be rejected, because a turn in the party's policy has begun, and the party has conceded. Quoted from: Yuliia Kysla, "Stalinski spektakli viry, abo yak dystsyplinuvaly ukrainskykh pysmennykiv u povienni roky", in: *Ukraina moderna*, 27-11-2019, [online], in: http://uamoderna.com/md/kysla-stalinist-performances/?fbclid=IwAR3LeXDqPTb2hd_7IgekbWKAPc-NaHtJzGgIBh361Ged3-44IV8Uf30gl2s

⁵³ At the end of 1946, a new Ukrainian spelling, much closer to Russian one, was approved, Ukrainian national phraseology began to disappear from the cultural and ideological sphere. It was gradually replaced by Soviet, All-Union phraseology, see: V. Danylenko, *op. cit.*, p. 710.

⁵⁴ V. Danylenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 722–723.

⁵⁵ Werner G. Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982, p. 48; Serhii Yekelchuk, *Imperii pamiaty...*, pp. 115–116.

magazine *Homeland* (Вітчизна) (October 1946)⁵⁶. If in the first case, it was about the inadmissibility of "bowing before the West", then in the second, it was about the need to fight against bourgeois-nationalist ideology⁵⁷.

Ensuring the discursive durability of the emerging imperial Russian concept of history and the place of Ukraine and Ukrainians in it, the Bolshevik government preferred to "erase" from memory, forget and erase from physical life its former and designated enemies. In the post-war doctrine of hatred, there was no place for the "Trotskyists", the "Petlyurites", the "Skoropadchiks", the "Makhnovists", the "Borotbysts", the Bundists, the members of the Ukrainian Liberation Union and the Ukrainian nationalists (various actual or imagined political or public groups). In a symbolic sense, they all disappeared even as the object of devastating criticism. In physical terms, those of them who received a sentence of 10 years of imprisonment and survived in camps and prisons should have been released in 1947–1948. However, this did not happen. The Bolshevik authorities preferred to bury them in prisons and exiles, resorting to an unprecedented punitive action – groundless repeated repressions⁵⁸.

The leaders of the Kremlin hid their fear of a completely modern European with the tendency of a growth of national spirit and national capacity, which marked the first post-war years in Europe. They did this by a walling-up in the Gulag and placed in exile the memory of the national revolution and its bearers of the stormy 1920s marked by hope for Ukrainian revival, exposing Ukrainian authors and scientists as bearers of archaism, national relics. Its incarnations were the Gaullist myth of "France and the French who liberated themselves" and powerful national liberation movements⁵⁹, which unfolded in the part of Europe that became the zone of Soviet influence.

So, the first steps in the "liberation" of the Ukrainian territory from the Nazis were, on the one hand, their "sanitation" – finding collaborators (or claiming people were collaborators for just staying in the occupation) and calling them enemies and collaborators. The second step included looting, violence and murders committed by the Red Army on Ukrainian lands, with "sanitation" becoming a logical prologue for the Bolsheviks to resume the practices of political and economic terror. Looting and robberies then determined the answer to the questions "whether the Soviet authorities considered the

⁵⁶ *Kulturne budivmytstvo v Ukrainiskii RSR cherven 1941–1950*, collection of documents, Kyiv: 1989, pp. 266–267.

⁵⁷ Serhii Yekelchuk, *Imperia pamiaty...*, pp. 119–120.

⁵⁸ More about the unfolding of the tragedy and its victims see: Tamara Vronska, *Povtomyky: pryrecheni brantsi HULA-Hu (1948–1953)*, Kyiv: Tempora, 2019.

⁵⁹ *The Anti-Soviet Resistance in the Baltic States*, edited by Arvydas Anušauskas, Vilnius: Pasauliui apie mus, 2006; Norman M. Naimark, "Stalin and Europe in the Postwar Period, 1945–53: Issues and Problems", in: *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift für moderne europäische Geschichte / Revue d'histoire européenne contemporaine*, vol. 2, no: Communist Regimes and Parties after the Second World War, 2004, pp. 28–57; DMITAR TASIĆ. "Violence as Cause and Consequence: Comparisons of Anti-Communist Armed Resistance in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria after the Second World War", in: *CAS (Centre for Advanced Study Sofia) Working Paper Series*, 2018, vol. 10, pp. 3–35.

Ukrainian territories their ownership" and "whether the Red Army men were liberators or occupiers".

When implementing the practice of punishing collaborators, the Soviet authorities proceeded from pragmatic considerations regarding the preservation of personnel for the recovery of the economy, and therefore gradually narrowed the circle of those who had to be punished for "treason to the homeland". In this "solemn forgiveness" of the occupied people, a large-scale symbolic theft took place. The Ukrainian people were removed from the list of the most affected, from the list of the most heroic, and got used to thanking the "Russian people for their liberation".

Having taken the next "liberation" step, the Soviet Bolsheviks dealt a blow to the Ukrainian national revival, which was a tangible consequence of Ukraine's exit from the war and was reflected, first of all, in powerful literary, artistic and film stories. Ukrainian nationalism, marked in the Kremlin's rhetoric as dangerous, and "bourgeois" and "hostile", was curbed at all levels: in culture, in church life, and in the historical narrative where Ukrainian nationalism was reliably tied to "German fascism". The re-Sovietisation of such a group contributed to the "further symbolic codification of Soviet Ukraine as a kind of 'national periphery'"⁶⁰ and forced Ukrainians to 'identify themselves with Soviet modernity and the Russian imperial past.'⁶¹

Olena Stiazhkina

„Išlaisvinti“, pasmerkti ir „nedėkingi“: Ukrainos ir ukrainiečių bolševikinė „resovietizacija“ (1943 m.– 6 deš. pradžia)

SANTRAUKA

Šio straipsnio tikslas – išanalizuoti pirmuosius bolševikų valdžios „išvadavimo“ ir prieškarinio *status quo* atkūrimo žingsnius Ukrainos teritorijoje. Užduotis – išsiaiškinti, kokias „išvadavimo“ praktikas patyrė okupuoti žmonės; kaip bolševikai reagavo į tautinės idėjos atgaivinimą; kaip resovietizacija tapo Rusijos imperinės tvarkos atkūrimo pagrindu; kaip Ukraina tapo placdarmu iš naujo išrasti sovietinio imperializmo modelį, „orientuotą į Rusiją“.

Šiame straipsnyje resovietizacija traktuojama kaip bolševikų valdžios mechanizmai ir praktikos (bei įrankiai) ukrainiečių bendruomenių, kurios po karo turėjo Krekliui pavojingų intencijų – visuomenės solidarumo ir gebėjimo pasipriešinti – atžvilgiu.

Darbo šaltiniai – centrinių valdžios institucijų, saugumo tarnybų archyviniai dokumentai, atsiminimai, statistikos dokumentai, korespondencija. Metodologinis pagrindas yra agentūros samprata, kuri reiškia galimybę bet kokiomis aplinkybėmis pasirinkti savo gyvenimo variantus.

Išvados. Jau pirmaisiais grįžimo į Ukrainos žemes etapais bolševikai atnaujino represijas ir plėšikavimą, kas buvo plačiai taikoma iki Antrojo pasaulinio karo. Persekiojimu ir represijomis buvo smogta Ukrainos nacionaliniam atgimimui. Vykdamas plačias kampanijas prieš Ukrainos buržuazinį nacionalizmą ir už „dėkingumą rusams už išvadavimą“, ukrainiečiai buvo užmaršinami ir kaip Antrojo pasaulinio karo aukos, ir kaip didvyriai.

REIKŠMINIAI ŽODŽIAI: resovietizacija, marodieriai, ukrainiečių nacionalizmas, represijos, Rusijos imperializmas.

Олена Стяжкіна

«Визволені», заставрані й «невдячні»: практики більшовицької «рерадянiзацiї» України та українців (1943 – поч. 1950-х рр.)

РЕЗЮМЕ

Мета цієї статті – аналіз перших кроків «визволення» та відновлення довоєнного status quo для більшовицької влади на території України. Завдання – з'ясувати, які практики «звільнення» відчували на собі окуповані люди, в який спосіб більшовики зреагували на пожеввлення національної ідеї; як рерадянiзацiя ставала фундаментом для відновлення російського імперського порядку; як Україні стала плацдармом для перевинайдення моделі радянського імперіалізму у його «рускоцентрованій» поставі.

У цьому тексті рерадянiзацiя розглядатиметься як механізми й практики (сукупно з інструментарієм) більшовицької влади щодо українських спільнот, які вийшли з війни із небезпечними для Кремля інтенціями громадської солідарності та здатності чинити опір.

Джерельна база роботи включає архівні документи центральних органів влади, служби безпеки, мемуари, статистику, листування. Методологічним підґрунтям є концепція агентності, яка передбачає здатність людей за будь-яких обставин обирати варіанти власних практик життя.

Висновки: вже на перших етапах повернення на українські землі більшовики відновили репресивні та мародерські практики, що були широко застосованими ними до Другої світової війни. Через цькування та репресії було завдано удару по українському національному відродженню. Завдяки широким кампаніям проти українського буржуазного націоналізму та за «вдячність руському народу за визволення», українців почали символічно «відтискати» і як жертв, і як героїв Другої Світової.

КЛЮЧОВІ СЛОВА: Рерадянiзацiя, мародери, український націоналізм, репресії, російський імперіалізм.